CVE-2023-52137: Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)
Summary The tj-actions/verify-changed-files action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. Details The verify-changed-files workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ;
Published Jan 2, 2024 · Updated Jan 10, 2024
Affected packages
tj-actions/verify-changed-files
- Ecosystem
- GitHub Actions
- Affected
- < 17
- Fixed in
- 17
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The `tj-actions/verify-changed-files` action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The `verify-changed-files` workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and \ (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push`.
Proof of Concept
- Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example
$(whoami).txtwould be a valid filename. - Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the
List all changed files tracked and untracked filesstep.
- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
run: |
echo "Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}"Example output:
##[group]Run echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"
echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"[0m
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
Changed files: runner.txtImpact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
- A new
safe_outputinput would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
env:
CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}
run: |
echo "Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES"Resources
Credited to jorgectf, jsoref.
References
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
