CVE-2024-21644: pyload Unauthenticated Flask Configuration Leakage vulnerability
Summary Any unauthenticated user can browse to a specific URL to expose the Flask config, including the SECRETKEY variable. Details Any unauthenticated user can browse to a specific URL to expose the Flask config, including the SECRETKEY variable. PoC Run pyload in the default configuration by running the following command Now browse to http://localhost:8000/render/info.html.
Published Jan 8, 2024
Affected packages
pyload-ng
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.5.0b3.dev77
- Fixed in
- 0.5.0b3.dev77
- Check
pip show pyload-ng
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Any unauthenticated user can browse to a specific URL to expose the Flask config, including the SECRET_KEY variable.
Details
Any unauthenticated user can browse to a specific URL to expose the Flask config, including the SECRET_KEY variable.
PoC
Run pyload in the default configuration by running the following command
pyloadNow browse to http://localhost:8000/render/info.html. Notice how the Flask configuration gets displayed. PoC
I was quite amused by this finding. I think it's a very interesting coming together of things that is so unlikely to happen. Below I will detail my process a bit more.
I was looking through the code to see how the authorization mechanism is implemented when I spotted this route, which can be accessed by any unauthenticated actor
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/57d81930edb59177c60830ad8ac36a91d0ec4c4e/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py#L33C1-L37C51
@bp.route("/render/<path:filename>", endpoint="render")
def render(filename):
mimetype = mimetypes.guess_type(filename)[0] or "text/html"
data = render_template(filename)
return flask.Response(data, mimetype=mimetype)This route allows me to load in any of the predefined templates. However, these templates will be lacking any form of context, and as such it doesn't seem too useful. That is until I loaded the info.html template and scrolled down, revealing the Flask config. This was purely accidental, and I did not understand why it happened, until I looked at the template
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/57d81930edb59177c60830ad8ac36a91d0ec4c4e/src/pyload/webui/app/templates/info.html#L64C1-L67C10
<tr>
<td>{{ _("Config folder:") }}</td>
<td>{{ config }}</td>
</tr>In Flask, every template always gets the Flask config passed to it as the config variable. In the normal execution of this template, this value gets overwritten in the function below, but since we're calling it and bypassing this function altogether, it doesn't get overwritten. Would this variable not be named config and named configuration or Config instead, then this exploit wouldn't work. The likelihood of this occurring is so small, but it seems to have happened here.
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/57d81930edb59177c60830ad8ac36a91d0ec4c4e/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py#L450C1-L461C51
context = {
"python": sys.version,
"os": " ".join((os.name, sys.platform) + extra),
"version": api.get_server_version(),
"folder": PKGDIR,
"config": api.get_userdir(),
"download": conf["general"]["storage_folder"]["value"],
"freespace": format.size(api.free_space()),
"webif": conf["webui"]["port"]["value"],
"language": conf["general"]["language"]["value"],
}
return render_template("info.html", **context)Impact
Depending on the how the Flask config data is used, it could have detrimental consequences for the security. It's crucial to keep the SECRET_KEY secret and never expose it in your code or configuration files.
Credited to PinkDraconian.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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