CVE-2024-49364: tiny-secp256k1 vulnerable to private key extraction when signing a malicious JSON-stringifyable message in bundled environment
Summary Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is buffer package Details This affects only environments where require('buffer') is E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc.
Published Jun 30, 2025 · Updated Jul 1, 2025
Affected packages
tiny-secp256k1
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.1.6
- Fixed in
- 1.1.7
- Check
npm ls tiny-secp256k1
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is `buffer` package
Details
This affects only environments where require('buffer') is E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc.
Buffer.isBuffer check can be bypassed, resulting in k reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one)
v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual Uint8Array instance
Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction
While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still should not leak the private key
Also, message validation could have the same bug (out of scope for this report, but could be possible in some situations), which makes this attack more likely when used in a chain
https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/pull/140 is a subtle fix for this
PoC
This code deliberately doesn't provide funnyBuffer and extractTiny for now, could be updated later
import secp256k1 from 'tiny-secp256k1'
import crypto from 'crypto'
const key = crypto.randomBytes(32)
const msg0 = crypto.randomBytes(32)
const sig0 = secp256k1.sign(msg0, key).toString('hex')
const msg1 = funnyBuffer(msg0)
const sig1 = secp256k1.sign(msg1, key).toString('hex')
const restored = extractTiny(msg0, sig0, sig1)
console.log('Guesses:', JSON.stringify(restored, undefined, 2))
const recheck = (k) => secp256k1.sign(msg0, Buffer.from(k, 'hex')).toString('hex') === sig0
console.log('Rechecked:', JSON.stringify(restored.filter(recheck)))
console.log('Actual key', key.toString('hex'))Output:
Guesses: [
"8f351953047e6b149e0595547e7d10a8a1edc61bd519b5b2514202a495e434ed",
"ebc81e1632a1b3255589ba84364949a0a6fd0229444519765570706d394671dd"
]
Rechecked: ["ebc81e1632a1b3255589ba84364949a0a6fd0229444519765570706d394671dd"]
Actual key ebc81e1632a1b3255589ba84364949a0a6fd0229444519765570706d394671ddImpact
Full private key extraction when signing a single malicious message (that passes JSON.stringify/JSON.parse and can come from network)
Credited to ChALkeR.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
