CVE-2024-53861: PyJWT Issuer field partial matches allowed
Summary The wrong string if check is run for iss checking, resulting in "acb" being accepted for "abc". Details This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the "iss" claim changed from isinstance(issuer, list) to isinstance(issuer, Sequence). Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, in is also used for string comparison. This results in if "abc" not in "abcd": being checked instead of if "abc" != "abc":.
Published Dec 2, 2024
Affected packages
PyJWT
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- = 2.10.0
- Fixed in
- 2.10.1
- Check
pip show PyJWT
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The wrong string if check is run for iss checking, resulting in "acb" being accepted for "_abc_".
Details
This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the "iss" claim changed from isinstance(issuer, list) to isinstance(issuer, Sequence).
- if isinstance(issuer, list):
+ if isinstance(issuer, Sequence):
if payload["iss"] not in issuer:
raise InvalidIssuerError("Invalid issuer")
else:Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, in is also used for string comparison. This results in if "abc" not in "__abcd__": being checked instead of if "abc" != "__abc__":.
PoC
Check out the unit tests added here: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt-ghsa-75c5-xw7c-p5pm
issuer = "urn:expected"
payload = {"iss": "urn:"}
token = jwt.encode(payload, "secret")
# decode() succeeds, even though `"urn:" != "urn:expected". No exception is raised.
with pytest.raises(InvalidIssuerError):
jwt.decode(token, "secret", issuer=issuer, algorithms=["HS256"])Impact
I would say the real world impact is not that high, seeing as the signature still has to match. We should still fix it.
Credited to fabianbadoi.
References
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53861
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/33022c25525c1020869c71ce2a4109e44ae4ced1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pm
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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