CVE-2025-46727: Rack has an Unbounded-Parameter DoS in Rack::QueryParser
Summary Rack::QueryParser parses query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies into Ruby data structures without imposing any limit on the number of parameters, allowing attackers to send requests with extremely large numbers of parameters.
Published May 8, 2025 · Updated May 9, 2025
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.14
- Fixed in
- 2.2.14
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0, < 3.0.16
- Fixed in
- 3.0.16
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.1, < 3.1.14
- Fixed in
- 3.1.14
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::QueryParser parses query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies into Ruby data structures without imposing any limit on the number of parameters, allowing attackers to send requests with extremely large numbers of parameters.
Details
The vulnerability arises because Rack::QueryParser iterates over each &-separated key-value pair and adds it to a Hash without enforcing an upper bound on the total number of parameters. This allows an attacker to send a single request containing hundreds of thousands (or more) of parameters, which consumes excessive memory and CPU during parsing.
Impact
An attacker can trigger denial of service by sending specifically crafted HTTP requests, which can cause memory exhaustion or pin CPU resources, stalling or crashing the Rack server. This results in full service disruption until the affected worker is restarted.
Mitigation
- Update to a version of Rack that limits the number of parameters parsed, or
- Use middleware to enforce a maximum query string size or parameter count, or
- Employ a reverse proxy (such as Nginx) to limit request sizes and reject oversized query strings or bodies.
Limiting request body sizes and query string lengths at the web server or CDN level is an effective mitigation.
Credited to TaiPhung217, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-gjh7-p2fx-99vx
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46727
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/2bb5263b464b65ba4b648996a579dbd180d2b712
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/3f5a4249118d09d199fe480466c8c6717e43b6e3
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/cd6b70a1f2a1016b73dc906f924869f4902c2d74
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2025-46727.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gjh7-p2fx-99vx
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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