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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2025-59830: Rack has an unsafe default in Rack::QueryParser allows params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm

Summary Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its paramslimit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.

Published Sep 25, 2025

Affected packages

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 2.2.18
Fixed in
2.2.18
Check
bundle info rack

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.

Details

The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string counts only & characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n splits on both & and ;. This mismatch means that queries using ; separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit to be bypassed.

Other safeguards (bytesize_limit and key_space_limit) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.

Impact

Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.

Rack::Request, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser is used directly.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both & and ; are counted consistently toward params_limit.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure QueryParser with an explicit delimiter (e.g., &) to avoid the mismatch.
  • As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.

Credited to kwkr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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