CVE-2025-59830: Rack has an unsafe default in Rack::QueryParser allows params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters
Summary Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its paramslimit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.
Published Sep 25, 2025
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.18
- Fixed in
- 2.2.18
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.
Details
The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string counts only & characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n splits on both & and ;. This mismatch means that queries using ; separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit to be bypassed.
Other safeguards (bytesize_limit and key_space_limit) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.
Impact
Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.
Rack::Request, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser is used directly.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both
∧are counted consistently towardparams_limit. - If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure
QueryParserwith an explicit delimiter (e.g.,&) to avoid the mismatch. - As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.
Credited to kwkr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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