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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2025-61772: Rack's multipart parser buffers unbounded per-part headers, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-wpv5-97wm-hp9c

Summary Rack::Multipart::Parser can accumulate unbounded data when a multipart part’s header block never terminates with the required blank line (CRLFCRLF). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes to memory without a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service (DoS).

Published Oct 7, 2025 · Updated Oct 13, 2025

Affected packages

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 2.2.19
Fixed in
2.2.19
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.1, < 3.1.17
Fixed in
3.1.17
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.2, < 3.2.2
Fixed in
3.2.2
Check
bundle info rack

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser can accumulate unbounded data when a multipart part’s header block never terminates with the required blank line (CRLFCRLF). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes to memory without a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service (DoS).

Details

While reading multipart headers, the parser waits for CRLFCRLF using:

@sbuf.scan_until(/(.*?\r\n)\r\n/m)

If the terminator never appears, it continues appending data (@sbuf.concat(content)) indefinitely. There is no limit on accumulated header bytes, so a single malformed part can consume memory proportional to the request body size.

Impact

Attackers can send incomplete multipart headers to trigger high memory use, leading to process termination (OOM) or severe slowdown. The effect scales with request size limits and concurrency. All applications handling multipart uploads may be affected.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to a patched Rack version that caps per-part header size (e.g., 64 KiB).
  • Until then, restrict maximum request sizes at the proxy or web server layer (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).

Credited to kwkr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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