CVE-2025-61919: Rack is vulnerable to a memory-exhaustion DoS through unbounded URL-encoded body parsing
Summary Rack::Request#POST reads the entire request body into memory for Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded, calling rack.input.read(nil) without enforcing a length or cap. Large request bodies can therefore be buffered completely into process memory before parsing, leading to denial of service (DoS) through memory exhaustion.
Published Oct 10, 2025 · Updated Oct 13, 2025
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.20
- Fixed in
- 2.2.20
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0, < 3.1.18
- Fixed in
- 3.1.18
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.2, < 3.2.3
- Fixed in
- 3.2.3
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::Request#POST reads the entire request body into memory for Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded, calling rack.input.read(nil) without enforcing a length or cap. Large request bodies can therefore be buffered completely into process memory before parsing, leading to denial of service (DoS) through memory exhaustion.
Details
When handling non-multipart form submissions, Rack’s request parser performs:
form_vars = get_header(RACK_INPUT).readSince read is called with no argument, the entire request body is loaded into a Ruby String. This occurs before query parameter parsing or enforcement of any params_limit. As a result, Rack applications without an upstream body-size limit can experience unbounded memory allocation proportional to request size.
Impact
Attackers can send large application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies to consume process memory, causing slowdowns or termination by the operating system (OOM). The effect scales linearly with request size and concurrency. Even with parsing limits configured, the issue occurs *before* those limits are enforced.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack that enforces form parameter limits using
query_parser.bytesize_limit, preventing unbounded reads ofapplication/x-www-form-urlencodedbodies. - Enforce strict maximum body size at the proxy or web server layer (e.g., Nginx
client_max_body_size, ApacheLimitRequestBody).
Credited to Pirikara, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-6xw4-3v39-52mm
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/4e2c903991a790ee211a3021808ff4fd6fe82881
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/cbd541e8a3d0c5830a3c9a30d3718ce2e124f9db
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/e179614c4a653283286f5f046428cbb85f21146f
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61919
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2025-61919.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xw4-3v39-52mm
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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