CVE-2025-62610: Hono Improper Authorization vulnerability
Improper Authorization in Hono (JWT Audience Validation) Hono’s JWT authentication middleware did not validate the aud (Audience) claim by default. As a result, applications using the middleware without an explicit audience check could accept tokens intended for other audiences, leading to potential cross-service access (token mix-up).
Published Oct 22, 2025 · Updated Oct 23, 2025
Affected packages
hono
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 1.1.0, < 4.10.2
- Fixed in
- 4.10.2
- Check
npm ls hono
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Improper Authorization in Hono (JWT Audience Validation)
Hono’s JWT authentication middleware did not validate the aud (Audience) claim by default. As a result, applications using the middleware without an explicit audience check could accept tokens intended for other audiences, leading to potential cross-service access (token mix-up).
The issue is addressed by adding a new verification.aud configuration option to allow RFC 7519–compliant audience validation. This change is classified as a security hardening improvement, but the lack of validation can still be considered a vulnerability in deployments that rely on default JWT verification.
Recommended secure configuration
You can enable RFC 7519–compliant audience validation using the new verification.aud option:
import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'
const app = new Hono()
app.use(
'/api/*',
jwt({
secret: 'my-secret',
verification: {
// Require this API to only accept tokens with aud = 'service-a'
aud: 'service-a',
},
})
)Below is the original description by the reporter. For security reasons, it does not include PoC reproduction steps, as the vulnerability can be clearly understood from the technical description.
---
The original description by the reporter
Summary
Hono’s JWT Auth Middleware does not provide a built-in `aud` (Audience) verification option, which can cause confused-deputy / token-mix-up issues: an API may accept a valid token that was issued for a different audience (e.g., another service) when multiple services share the same issuer/keys. This can lead to unintended cross-service access. Hono’s docs list verification options for iss/nbf/iat/exp only, with no `aud` support; RFC 7519 requires that when an aud claim is present, tokens MUST be rejected unless the processing party identifies itself in that claim.
Note: This problem likely exists in the JWK/JWKS-based middleware as well (e.g., jwk / verifyWithJwks)
Details
- The middleware’s
verifyOptionsenumerate onlyiss,nbf,iat, andexp; there is no `aud` option. The same omission appears in the JWT Helper’s “Payload Validation” list. Developers relying on the middleware for complete standards-aligned validation therefore won’t check audience by default. - Standards requirement: RFC 7519 §4.1.3 states that each principal intended to process the JWT MUST identify itself with a value in the
audclaim; if it does not, the JWT MUST be rejected (whenaudis present). Lack of a first-classaudcheck increases the risk that tokens issued for Service B are accepted by Service A. - Real-world effect: In deployments with a single IdP/JWKS and shared keys across multiple services, a token minted for one audience can be mistakenly accepted by another audience unless developers implement a custom audience check.
- For example, with Google Identity (OIDC), iss is always https://accounts.google.com (shared across apps), but aud differs per application because it is that app’s OAuth client ID; therefore, an attacker can host a separate service that supports “Sign in with Google,” obtain a valid ID token (JWT) for the victim user, and—if your API does not verify aud—use that token to access your API with the victim’s privileges.
Impact
Type: Authentication/authorization weakness via token mix-up (confused-deputy).
Who is impacted: Any Hono user who:
- shares an issuer/keys across multiple services (common with a single IdP/JWKS)
- distinguishes tokens by intended recipient using
aud.
What can happen:
- Cross-service access: A token for *Service B* may be accepted by *Service A*.
- Boundary erosion: ID tokens and access tokens, or separate API audiences, can be inadvertently intermixed.
- This may causes unauthorized invocation of sensitive endpoints.
Recommended remediation:
- Add
verifyOptions.aud(string | string[] | RegExp) to the middleware and enforce RFC 7519 semantics: In verify method, ifaudis present and does not match with specified audiences, reject. - Ensure equivalent
audhandling exists in the JWK/JWKS flow (jwkmiddleware /verifyWithJwks) so users of external IdPs can enforce audience consistently.
Credited to okazu-dm.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-126355
Hono: `csrf()` does not check requests sent by hyperlink auditing (`text/ping`)
medium5.3Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-126356
Hono: `validator('form')` skips validation for `multipart/form-data` requests with extra parameters
medium5.3Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-126357
Hono: `mount()` and `app.mount()` can forward a path that bypasses middleware scoped inside the mount prefix
medium5.3Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-126358
Hono: RegExpRouter skips wildcard middleware for some route sets and for paths with an encoded line terminator
medium5.3Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-126359
Hono: `css` helper does not escape a closing tag split between the template and an interpolated value, allowing HTML injection
low3.4Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-111757
Hono: `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static paths
medium5.3Oct 20, 2026
