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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2025-64702: quic-go HTTP/3 QPACK Header Expansion DoS

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-g754-hx8w-x2g6

Summary An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go's HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large header field section (many unique header names and/or large values).

Published Dec 11, 2025 · Updated Dec 17, 2025

Affected packages

github.com/quic-go/quic-go

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.57.0
Fixed in
0.57.0
Check
go list -m github.com/quic-go/quic-go

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go's HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large header field section (many unique header names and/or large values). The implementation builds an http.Header (used on the http.Request and http.Response, respectively), while only enforcing limits on the size of the (QPACK-compressed) HEADERS frame, but not on the decoded header, leading to memory exhaustion.

Impact

A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on quic-go's HTTP/3 servers or clients by triggering excessive memory allocation, potentially leading to crashes or exhaustion. It affects both servers and clients due to symmetric header construction.

Details

In HTTP/3, headers are compressed using QPACK (RFC 9204). quic-go's HTTP/3 server (and client) decodes the QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame into header fields, then constructs an http.Request (or response).

http3.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and http3.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes, respectively, limit encoded HEADERS frame size (default: 1 MB server, 10 MB client), but not decoded size. A maliciously crafted HEADERS frame can expand to ~50x the encoded size using QPACK static table entries with long names / values.

RFC 9114 requires enforcing decoded field section size limits via SETTINGS, which quic-go did not do.

The Fix

quic-go now enforces RFC 9114 decoded field section size limits, sending SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE and using incremental QPACK decoding to check the header size after each entry, aborting early on violations with HTTP 431 (on the server side) and stream reset (on the client side).

Credited to sfoxio.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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