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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-100397: Rucio: Unauthenticated administrator impersonation through SSH challenge tokens

criticalCVSS 3.1 9.8GHSA-x585-4vv8-2mh2

Rucio, the scientific data management system, accepts SSH challenge tokens as normal login tokens. An unauthenticated attacker can request a challenge token for any account, including root, and use it as a bearer token against the Rucio API. Upgrade to 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 or 41.1.1, depending on your release line.

Published Nov 13, 2026 · Analysis Nov 13, 2026

What an attacker can do

Rucio's SSH login flow issues a short-lived nonce called a challenge token. The server creates it from the account name in the X-Rucio-Account header and asks for no prior authentication. It stores the token in the same database table as real authentication tokens. The function validate_auth_token in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py does not tell the two kinds apart, so a challenge token passes as a credential.

The attack takes two requests. First, call /auth/ssh_challenge_token with X-Rucio-Account: root. The server returns 200 OK and the token in the X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token header. Second, send that value in X-Rucio-Auth-Token to any other endpoint, for example /accounts/whoami. The token lives about ten seconds, but a script can repeat the pair as often as it likes.

The attacker needs only network access to the Rucio server. The result is access as any chosen account, including administrators. That means reading and changing data catalogs, replication rules and account settings, as far as that account's permissions go. The CVSS vector is network, no privileges, no user interaction, high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.

Who is affected

Every Rucio release from 1.14.0.post1 up to the patched versions is affected. By line: 1.14.0.post1 to before 35.9.1, 36.0.0rc1 to before 38.6.1, 39.0.0rc1 to before 40.4.2, and 41.0.0rc1 to before 41.1.1. The server must expose the REST auth endpoints. Check the installed version:

pip show rucio

For container deployments, check the image tag of the server and auth pods.

rucio

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 1.14.0.post1, < 35.9.1
Fixed in
35.9.1
Check
pip show rucio

rucio

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.1
Fixed in
38.6.1
Check
pip show rucio

rucio

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 39.0.0rc1, < 40.4.2
Fixed in
40.4.2
Check
pip show rucio

rucio

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 41.0.0rc1, < 41.1.1
Fixed in
41.1.1
Check
pip show rucio

How to fix it

Upgrade to the patched release on your line: 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 or 41.1.1.

pip install --upgrade "rucio==41.1.1"

Use the version that matches your line. The release pages also list 35.9.1.post1, 38.6.2 and 41.2.0 as later releases. The advisory gives no workaround. Until you patch, restrict network access to the Rucio auth and REST servers to trusted clients.

How to tell if you were hit

Search web server or Rucio server logs for requests to /auth/ssh_challenge_token with an X-Rucio-Account header, especially for privileged accounts such as root, from hosts that do not use SSH authentication. Then look for X-Rucio-Auth-Token values used within about ten seconds on other endpoints, such as /accounts/whoami, from the same address. Review recent changes made by admin accounts that you did not expect. A challenge request is normally followed by an SSH signature exchange, not by API calls.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

SSH challenge tokens are mistakenly accepted as valid credentials during the authentication token validation process.

While an SSH challenge token is intended as a short-lived nonce for use in a subsequent SSH key exchange, the function to validate authentication tokens does not differentiate between these and actual authentication tokens. Because challenge tokens are generated based on an account name provided via headers without requiring prior authentication, an unauthenticated attacker can request a valid "challenge" token for any account (including administrative ones) and use it to authenticate against other API endpoints.

Proof of Concept

The vulnerability exists because SSH challenge tokens are stored in the same database table as regular authentication tokens and validate_auth_token in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py accepts these "challenge" tokens. An attacker can obtain a challenge token for an account such as “root” via the REST API and then present it as a valid authentication bearer token:

  1. Request a challenge token for an arbitrary account (e.g., "root"): curl -i -H "X-Rucio-Account: root" https://rucio/auth/ssh_challenge_token
  2. The server returns a 200 OK with the header X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token.
  3. The attacker can then use this specific token within the ten-second challenge lifetime as an authentication credential in subsequent requests to the Rucio API: curl -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $CHALLENGE_TOKEN" https://rucio/accounts/whoami

Credited to thebatou.

Questions

Does exploiting CVE-2026-100397 need a Rucio account?

No. The challenge token endpoint takes the account name from a header and requires no authentication. The attacker only needs network access to the server.

Which Rucio versions are fixed?

35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 and 41.1.1, each for its own release line. Everything from 1.14.0.post1 before those versions is vulnerable.

The token only lasts ten seconds. Does that limit the risk?

Barely. An attacker can request a fresh token for each call, so the short life does not prevent use of the API.

Is it exploited in the wild?

No source says so. The advisory includes a working proof of concept, and the data has no CISA KEV entry.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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