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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-107214: Excelize Decrypt: unrecoverable panics on malformed OLE/CFB encrypted workbooks

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-2j4c-ffch-9f23

Summary Any file whose first 8 bytes are the OLE compound-file signature (D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1) is routed by OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes → openReaderAt → Decrypt. The version dispatch only guarantees len(EncryptionInfo) = 4 before handing attacker-controlled EncryptionInfo/EncryptedPackage buffers to standardDecrypt/agileDecrypt, and no callee validates structure.

Published Oct 8, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/xuri/excelize/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 2.3.1, < 2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94
Fixed in
2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94
Check
go list -m github.com/xuri/excelize/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Any file whose first 8 bytes are the OLE compound-file signature (D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1) is routed by OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes → openReaderAt → Decrypt. The version dispatch only guarantees len(EncryptionInfo) >= 4 before handing attacker-controlled EncryptionInfo/EncryptedPackage buffers to standardDecrypt/agileDecrypt, and no callee validates structure. Malformed but version-valid content therefore fails as an unrecovered runtime panic instead of an error, terminating the calling process.

Details

All panic classes below were execution-confirmed against pristine master (ecd99d761fe0, 2026-09-08). excelize.go:211-213 maps Decrypt *errors* to ErrWorkbookFileFormat, but panics bypass that path and kill the process.

| # | Malformed input | Panic | Site |
| 1 | standard, `len(EncryptionInfo)` 4–11 | slice bounds `[:12]` | `crypt.go:238` |
| 2 | standard, attacker-controlled `headerSize` uint32 | slice bounds `[12:12+headerSize]` / fixed-offset header reads | `crypt.go:238-249` |
| 3 | standard, verifier remainder < 72 (AES) / 60 (RC4) bytes | slice bounds in `standardEncryptionVerifier` | `crypt.go:282-295` |
| 4 | standard, `header.KeySize` = 0xFFFFFFFF | slice bounds `[:536870911]` with capacity 48 | `crypt.go:321` |
| 5 | standard, `EncryptedPackage` stream missing/short | slice bounds `[8:0]` | `crypt.go:268` |
| 6 | agile, `len(EncryptionInfo)` 4–7 | slice bounds `[8:4]` | `crypt.go:407` |
| 7 | agile, valid XML without `<keyEncryptors>` | index out of range `[0]` with length 0 | `crypt.go:416`, `433` |
| 8 | agile, `saltValue` decoded length ≠ AES block | `cipher.NewCBCDecrypter: IV length must equal block size` | `crypt.go:425` → `512` |
| 9 | any, `keyData blockSize="0"` | integer divide by zero | `crypt.go:539` |

Note the asymmetry pinpointing the missing constraint: the agile path already checks len(EncryptedPackage) >= 8 (crypt.go:520-523) but the standard path does not (#5). Existing tests only cover the error paths (short <4 bytes → ErrUnknownEncryptMechanism, bad XML, base64 errors), never these panic paths.

PoC

Standalone programs (public API only, inputs built in memory) were provided to the maintainer by email: 1-decrypt-panic builds seven malformed CFB containers and shows each panic escaping the public Decrypt API plus one end-to-end OpenReader crash. All cases print PANIC on master and BLOCKED with the proposed patch. A regression guard proves legitimate decryption is unaffected: a workbook encrypted with the package's own Encrypt() still opens through the same code path.

(A separate advisory covers the unbounded/negative allocation in extractPart.)

Impact

Any service that calls OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes on untrusted input (upload processing, mail scanning, spreadsheet conversion) can be killed remotely and without authentication by a file of ~100 bytes to ~3 KB. No password is required — panics occur during structural/parameter handling before successful decryption. Site variety means filtering one pattern does not help.

Proposed fix

A recover() boundary in Decrypt mapping any panic to ErrWorkbookFileFormat (restores the documented error-routing contract; legitimate standard/agile decryption unaffected). A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer; per-site length validation is recommended as defense in depth.

Credited to lmonstergg.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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