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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-113650: ApostropheCMS sanitize-html: unbounded recursion when re-sanitizing the fallback of a discarded iframe (stack overflow, nestingLimit not enforced)

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-c9rx-x947-fp3h

Summary Since 2.18.0, when an is not allowed and disallowedTagsMode is 'discard' (the defaults), its raw-text content is re-sanitized by a recursive call to sanitizeHtml(text, options) (the change from #5564, fixing #5550). The recursion has no bound and starts each nested call with a fresh state. Two consequences, both absent from 2.17.7 and 2.17.4: 1.

Published Oct 21, 2026

Affected packages

sanitize-html

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 2.18.0, < 2.18.1
Fixed in
2.18.1
Check
npm ls sanitize-html

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Since 2.18.0, when an <iframe> is not allowed and disallowedTagsMode is 'discard' (the defaults), its raw-text content is re-sanitized by a recursive call to sanitizeHtml(text, options) (the change from #5564, fixing #5550). The recursion has no bound and starts each nested call with a fresh state. Two consequences, both absent from 2.17.7 and 2.17.4:

  1. A few kilobytes of unclosed <iframe> tags throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded with the default options. Any application that sanitizes untrusted HTML with 2.18.0 can be made to throw on a small crafted input.
  2. nestingLimit is not enforced across a discarded iframe: each nested iframe restarts the depth count at zero, so the output can be nested arbitrarily deep regardless of the configured limit.

Affected versions

  • 2.18.0 (the current latest), and the main branch at the time of writing (the recursive call is still in packages/sanitize-html/index.js, in the ontext handler, branch tag === 'iframe' && !tagAllowed(tag) && options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard').
  • Not affected: 2.17.7 and 2.17.4 (tested with the same inputs below).

Tested with Node.js v26.7.0.

Reproduction 1: stack overflow with the default options

const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');

// with 2.18.0:
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(1000));  // 8,000 chars: returns ''
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(2000));  // 16,000 chars: throws RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(20000)); // 160,000 chars: throws RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

Results:

| input | 2.17.4 | 2.17.7 | 2.18.0 |
| `'<iframe>'.repeat(1000)` | ok | ok | ok |
| `'<iframe>'.repeat(2000)` | ok | ok | RangeError |
| `'<iframe>'.repeat(20000)` | ok | ok | RangeError |

The threshold depends on the remaining stack, so it is lower when sanitizeHtml is called from an already deep call stack (for example inside a server-side rendering pass).

Reproduction 2: nestingLimit is bypassed

const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');

const input = ('<iframe>' + ''.repeat(3)).repeat(50) + 'x';
const out = sanitizeHtml(input, { allowedTags: ['b'], nestingLimit: 3 });
// maximum nesting depth of  in `out`:
//   2.17.4: 2    2.17.7: 0 (fallback escaped as text)    2.18.0: 150

Without an iframe, the same options cap the output at three nested ` in all three versions. With k repetitions of '' + ''.repeat(3), 2.18.0 returns 3 * k nested ` (measured for k = 1, 5, 50: depth 3, 15, 150).

Cause

In 2.18.0 the ontext handler does:

} else if (
  tag === 'iframe' &&
  !tagAllowed(tag) &&
  options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard'
) {
  result += sanitizeHtml(text, options);
}

Because htmlparser2 treats <iframe> as a raw-text element, the text of an unclosed iframe is the whole remainder of the input; re-parsing it can meet another unclosed <iframe>, and so on, one stack frame (and one full re-parse) per iframe. The nested call also starts with its own depth, so tags inside the fallback are not counted against nestingLimit together with the enclosing tags.

Possible directions

Not a patch, only what would close both effects: bound the recursion (or process the fallback without recursing), and carry the current depth into the nested sanitization so that nestingLimit applies to the whole output.

Credited to hkmj19, amikhailovstiltsoft.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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