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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-115477: obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

highCVSS 4.0 7.1GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc

obsidian-tc, an MCP server for Obsidian vaults, lets a destructive tool call finish after the human declined the confirmation. This happens on Streamable HTTP with `auth.jwtSecret` set, when the client echoes the call's `requestState`. Versions 1.13.0 through 1.31.3 are affected. Upgrade to 1.31.4.

Published Oct 23, 2026 · Analysis Nov 2, 2026

What an attacker can do

For tools marked destructive: true, or scopes with a human-in-the-loop floor, the server offers an inputRequired confirmation. It mints a signed requestState before the elicitation step is asked. That state proves only that a resubmission belongs to the same call. The server treated it as proof of approval, so it never checked the user's answer.

The maintainers reproduced it: a destructive call answered with {action: "decline"} on the elicitation/create leg still wrote. A decline, a cancel, an omitted response or a malformed one all passed, as long as the client sent the state back.

A client that misbehaves, or one an attacker controls, can therefore delete notes, move them across folders, replace frontmatter or rewrite links after the human refused. Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable. The sixteen handler-gated tools, such as write_note overwrite and move_note, did not read the elicitation state on this path.

One gap remains after the fix. A non-compliant client can still answer its own elicitation leg with an approval, because the server cannot verify a human saw the form.

Who is affected

npm package obsidian-tc, versions 1.13.0 to 1.31.3. You are exposed if you serve over Streamable HTTP with auth.jwtSecret configured and a client that declares elicitation.form support (2026-07-28-era protocol). Stdio deployments, and HTTP deployments without auth.jwtSecret, never offer inputRequired and are not exposed.

npm ls obsidian-tc

obsidian-tc

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 1.13.0, <= 1.31.3
Fixed in
1.31.4
Check
npm ls obsidian-tc

How to fix it

Upgrade to obsidian-tc 1.31.4.

npm install [email protected]

The server now also requires the confirm leg's inputResponse to be {action: "accept", content: {approve: true}} before it trusts the echoed state. A declined, cancelled or unapproved round returns the ordinary elicit_required error and gets no second round for the same confirmation.

Workarounds from the advisory: run over stdio, or leave auth.jwtSecret unset. Either way the server falls back to the CLI elicit_token path. The release also adds in-band confirmation on stdio.

How to tell if you were hit

Look for destructive operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) in the vault that the user did not approve. Compare server logs of tools/call requests that carry requestState against the elicitation/create responses. A decline, cancel or missing response followed by a completed write is the pattern. If snapshots are enabled, restore_note can recover affected notes that were written through obsidian-tc before.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

On a Streamable HTTP deployment with auth.jwtSecret configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared elicitation.form support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (destructive: true, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an inputRequired confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound requestState on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call.

Details

Reproduced directly: a destructive: true tool call, offered inputRequired, answered with {action: "decline"} on the elicitation/create leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (write_note overwrite, move_note, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through.

Impact

A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforced by the server.

Patches

Fixed in 1.31.4: the server now also requires the confirm leg's own response (inputResponse) to be {action: "accept", content: {approve: true}} before trusting the echoed state. A declined, cancelled or not-approved round renders the ordinary elicit_required error and is never offered a second round for the same declined confirmation. The same release adds server-initiated in-band confirmation on stdio (legacy era), so stdio agents no longer need to mint elicit_token themselves.

Not addressed

A malicious or non-compliant client can still answer its own elicitation/create leg with an approval regardless of what the human said. The server cannot verify that the client rendered the form or that a human saw it; this is inherent to the client-driven half of the 2026-07-28 protocol. The legacy shim, where the server sends and owns the leg, does not share this gap.

Workarounds

Run affected deployments over stdio, or leave auth.jwtSecret unset so the requestState codec (and therefore inputRequired) is never offered; both fall back to the CLI elicit_token path.

Credit

Reported in GH #967; found and closed under THE-1106 (PR #969); the residual is documented in SECURITY.md.

References

  • PR #969, GH #967, CHANGELOG ## [1.31.4] ### Security
  • packages/server/src/mcp/server.ts (tools/call handler), packages/server/src/vault/hitl.ts

Credited to suavecito585.

Questions

Is obsidian-tc over stdio affected?

No. The advisory lists running over stdio as a workaround. The requestState codec, and with it inputRequired, is only offered on HTTP with auth.jwtSecret set.

Does 1.31.4 fully close the confirmation gap?

Not entirely. A malicious or non-compliant client can still approve its own elicitation leg. The server cannot verify that the client showed a human the form. This is documented in the project's SECURITY.md.

Which versions are vulnerable?

1.13.0 through 1.31.3. The requestState round trip first shipped in 1.13.0.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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