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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-115578: go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582

The defect ---------- Confirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte("XCLIENT") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) = 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586): case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd): if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '});

Published Nov 20, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/phires/go-guerrilla

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
= 1.6.7
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/phires/go-guerrilla

github.com/phires/go-guerrilla

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 1.6.7-1
Fixed in
1.6.7-1
Check
go list -m github.com/phires/go-guerrilla

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

The defect ---------- Confirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte("XCLIENT") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):

case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd): if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 { // line 586

A client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.

Input and attacker ------------------- Connect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\r\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.

Verification level ------------------ EXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).

Suggested fix ------------- Guard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.

Also checked and SOUND ---------------------- The rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.

Advisory-source note -------------------- Five-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.

Dedup ----- Dedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.

Tooling ------- AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic is executed-verified with a negative control (a bare XCLIENT crashes the real handleClient while XCLIENT with a trailing space returns 250), and the reporter confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes while the handler slices input[8:] on a per-connection goroutine with no recover.

Credited to arpitjain099.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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