CVE-2026-116794: russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation
The russh agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without asking the user. Other local processes, or a remote host reached through agent forwarding, can use such a key without approval. The Rust crate `russh` is fixed in 0.65.
Published Oct 30, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
The confirm constraint tells an SSH agent to ask the user before each use of a key. In russh, commit 3e04597 replaced the call to agent.confirm(key.clone()) with a hard-coded true. Sign requests therefore proceed without consulting the Agent implementation.
The private key is not exposed. What leaks is the ability to use it. A local process running as another user of the agent socket, or a remote host reached with ssh -A agent forwarding, can request signatures and authenticate as the user to other servers. The user never sees a prompt. The advisory rates it High (CVSS v4 8.3) with a local vector, low privileges and no interaction.
The advisory names Proton Pass desktop (russh 0.62.7) as a likely affected downstream user, though it was not tested. Any program that embeds the russh agent server and relies on confirmation is in scope.
Who is affected
Rust russh from 0.50.0-beta.12 through 0.64.1. Check your resolved version:
cargo tree -i russhAlso check applications you ship that embed the russh agent server, since they inherit the flaw.
russh
- Ecosystem
- Rust (crates.io)
- Affected
- < 0.65
- Fixed in
- 0.65
- Check
cargo tree -i russh
How to fix it
Upgrade to 0.65.
cargo update -p russh --precise 0.65.0The fix restores the agent.confirm(key.clone()).await call. Implementations that stub out confirm, one cited in the advisory uses todo!(), will now reach that stub. Each connection runs in its own task, so a panic affects only that connection.
How to tell if you were hit
Look for signing activity from your agent with no matching user prompt, and for unfamiliar processes connecting to the agent socket. If you use ssh -A, review authentication logs on target servers for logins from your key at times you did not connect.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The agent server in russh::keys::agent::server never calls Agent::confirm before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what ssh-add -c sends.
The call was replaced by a hard-coded true in 3e04597 ("Native async traits encore", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the Agent implementation. A user who added a key with -c is therefore never asked to confirm.
Details
Connection::try_sign notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent (server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1):
let agent = if needs_confirm {
let (agent, ok) = {
let _pk = key.clone();
Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
}
.await;
if !ok {
return Ok((agent, false));
}
agent
} else {
agent
};Before 3e04597 the first statement was let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;.
try_sign was checked in the published crates on crates.io:
- Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded
true. - russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call
agent.confirm. - Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected.
Not affected:
Agentimplementations that keep the defaultconfirm, which returnstrueanyway.- Checks made in
Agent::confirm_request, which is still called withMessageType::Signfor every sign request (L158-L159). - The agent client, and the SSH client and server.
PoC
- Add this test to
mod testinrussh/src/keys/mod.rs. It uses the module's existingIncominghelper andED25519_KEY. - Run
cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint.
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
// An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt.
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc<AtomicUsize>);
impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse {
fn confirm(
self,
_: std::sync::Arc<PrivateKey>,
) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Send + Unpin> {
self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false)))
}
}
let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let agent_path = dir.path().join("agent");
let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&agent_path).unwrap();
let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone());
tokio::spawn(async move {
agent::server::serve(
Incoming {
listener: &mut listener,
},
agent,
)
.await
});
let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some("blabla")).unwrap();
let public = key.public_key().clone();
let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&agent_path).await.unwrap();
let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream);
// What `ssh-add -c` sends.
client
.add_identity(&key, &[agent::Constraint::Confirm])
.await
.unwrap();
let signed = client
.sign_request(&AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b"data".to_vec())
.await;
let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert!(
signed.is_err(),
"the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: \
Agent::confirm was called {confirm_calls} time(s)"
);
assert_eq!(
confirm_calls, 1,
"Agent::confirm should be asked exactly once"
);
}On v0.64.1 (e5d80a0) the test fails:
the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: Agent::confirm was called 0 time(s)With the fix below it passes, and so do all 46 keys:: tests.
Impact
A russh-based agent whose Agent::confirm asks the user, or applies any other check, signs every request for a confirm-constrained key without running that check. Anyone who can talk to the agent can then use the key without the user's approval:
- other local processes of the user;
- the remote host, when the agent is forwarded (
ssh -A).
Preventing exactly this is the purpose of the confirm constraint. RFC 9987 §10 names it as what stops an attacker with access to the agent from "stealing use of those keys".
Because the agent accepts the constraint, ssh-add -c reports success and the user believes the key is protected. RFC 9987 §5.2.7 says an agent that does not support a constraint MUST refuse the key instead.
The private key itself is not exposed. The impact is unauthorized use of it for as long as the attacker can reach the agent: logging in to other hosts as the user, or signing data such as git commits.
Known affected downstream user (from its public code; not tested): Proton Pass desktop, which uses russh 0.62.7.
- It adds every key with
Constraint::Confirm(mod.rs L332). - It uses
Agent::confirmas its "Pass is unlocked" check before signing, and defersMessageType::Signfromconfirm_requestto it (L75-L100). That check never runs. - Proton also removes keys from the agent on lock and logout (ssh-agent.middleware.ts L23-L27).
So the exposure there is limited to states in which keys stay loaded while Pass is not unlocked. Their own code notes, for example, that the agent persists across renderer reloads and account switches.
Suggested fix
--- a/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs
+++ b/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs
@@ -346,11 +346,7 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin + 'static, A: Agent + Send + Sync
}
};
let agent = if needs_confirm {
- let (agent, ok) = {
- let _pk = key.clone();
- Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
- }
- .await;
+ let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
if !ok {
return Ok((agent, false));
}When confirm returns false, try_sign returns false and the agent answers SSH_AGENT_FAILURE, as it did before the regression.
Compatibility note for the release notes: confirm is called again for confirm-constrained keys, so implementations that stub it out will now hit that stub.
- For example, Litterbox implements
confirmastodo!()(agent.rs L81-L87). - Each connection runs in its own task, so such a panic ends only that connection.
Related but separate: with the default confirm, the agent still accepts the confirm constraint without enforcing it. Given RFC 9987 §5.2.7, refusing such keys when the application does not implement confirm may be worth considering.
Credited to cataggar.
Questions
- Is the private key stolen?
No. The advisory says the key is not exposed, but others can use it to sign without approval.
- Does agent forwarding make it worse?
Yes. A remote host reached through
ssh -Acan ask the agent to sign, and no confirmation is shown.- Which version fixes it?
russh 0.65. Releases from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 are affected.
References
Read for this analysis:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116794
- https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826
- https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/62db6e7defd6d244159da962ccccb029e785ce0f
- https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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