CVE-2026-117601: Electrum: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it
Electrum before 4.8.3 trusts its server for unconfirmed transactions without checking signatures. A malicious server can swallow your broadcast and show a fake replacement paying the attacker, and fee-bumping that fake costs you money. Upgrade to 4.8.3. The advisory says servers do this in the wild.
Published Oct 28, 2026 · Updated Nov 20, 2026 · Analysis Nov 4, 2026
What an attacker can do
Electrum is a light client and trusts its connected server with mempool transactions. The attack works like this. When you broadcast tx1, the malicious server keeps it off the Bitcoin network. It then adds a conflicting tx2 to your history that sends the outputs to the attacker's address. tx2 has invalid signatures, but the client did not check them. The wallet shows tx2 as unconfirmed and hides tx1.
If you then use replace-by-fee to bump the fee of tx2, the wallet signs a new transaction with a higher fee that pays the attacker. One reporter lost money this way. Both reporters saw an attacker address that matched the last four characters of the real destination, which makes the swap easy to miss.
The attacker needs to operate a server you connect to. Clients that use a server they run themselves are not affected. Even after the fix, only inputs from addresses your wallet owns are validated, so incoming unconfirmed transactions are still not checked.
Who is affected
Electrum before 4.8.3, when connected to a public or untrusted server. Wallets connected to your own server are not affected.
Check the version in the Help menu, About, or:
pip show electrumelectrum
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.8.3
- Fixed in
- 4.8.3
- Check
pip show electrum
How to fix it
Upgrade to Electrum 4.8.3. The fix is commit 90fe308: the client now verifies signatures of wallet.is_mine inputs on mempool transactions before adding them to its local history. Binaries were released on 2026-10-24.
Workaround if you cannot upgrade: before signing any transaction, including a fee bump, check that the output addresses and amounts are what you expect. Compare the full address, not the last characters.
How to tell if you were hit
After you broadcast, check whether the history shows a different transaction than the one you sent, with other output addresses. Look up your transaction ID on an independent block explorer: if it is missing from the network, the server held it. Review any recent fee bump and its outputs. If you find a mismatch, stop using that server and connect to a different one or your own.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool ("unconfirmed") transactions. This is documented design. [0]
However now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it:
- when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it,
- and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address.
- Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design).
- The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed.
- If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.
Fixes
Commit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3. The client now verifies the signatures of wallet.is_mine inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).
Users should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case). As a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are as expected.
Clients that connect to servers they trust (e.g. run their own) are not affected.
Remarks
- some servers are performing this attack in the wild
- electrum received two user-reports of this. user1 noticed after broadcasting tx1 the wallet history contained a different tx. user2 bumped the fee of tx2 and lost money.
- user1 reported tx1 was not propagated over the bitcoin p2p, so the server held it
- both reported the attacker's output address in tx2 was grinded to match the last four chars of the legit address from tx1
- based on user2's report, the server constructed a tx2 with zero fee (presumably in hope of the user bumping its fee)
- even with the fix, we still only validate "is_mine" inputs (i.e. paying from addresses that the wallet owns). So e.g. "incoming" txs are not validated. The client lacks a full consensus engine / script interpreter, though even with that, to cover non-is_mine inputs, it would have to validate the unconfirmed parents recursively until reaching mined txs. Mined txs we already SPV.
Timeline
- 2026-10-11: user1 sends private disclosure, but the bump_fee vector is not realised
- 2026-10-18: user2 (Raju-K12) reports privately that they lost money after bump_fee
- 2026-10-23: version 4.8.3 git tagged, with the fix
- 2026-10-24: version 4.8.3 binaries released
- 2026-10-24: public disclosure
Credits
Electrum thanks user1 and Raju-K12 for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue to us.
Credited to Raju-K12.
Questions
- Is Electrum 4.8.2 affected by CVE-2026-117601?
Yes. Every version before 4.8.3 is affected. Version 4.8.3 was tagged on 2026-10-23 and its binaries released on 2026-10-24.
- Is this exploited in the wild?
Yes. The advisory says some servers are performing the attack, and one user lost money after fee-bumping a substituted transaction.
- Am I safe if I run my own Electrum server?
The advisory says clients that connect to servers they trust, for example their own, are not affected.
References
Read for this analysis:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-117601
- https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/commit/90fe30822561e515a9d2d6e5a352cc07780999eb
- https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/381361716824742
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/electrum-before-4.8.3-missing-signature-verification-of-mempool-transactions
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/11/msg00046.html
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
