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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-128126: AIOHTTP: Too many URL-encoded form fields block the event loop

highCVSS 4.0 8.7GHSA-xgw8-8ccx-rmqh

aiohttp 3.14.3 and earlier has no limit on the number of fields in a URL-encoded form body. A form POST with many repeated keys blocks the event loop through quadratic-time work in Request.post(). Upgrade to aiohttp 3.14.4.

Published Nov 16, 2026 · Analysis Nov 16, 2026

What an attacker can do

Request.post() parses a URL-encoded body into a MultiDict. Before the fix it accepted any number of fields. Inserting many repeated keys into a MultiDict takes quadratic time, so a body that fits inside the default client_max_size can still keep the CPU busy for a long time.

Because aiohttp serves requests on one asyncio event loop, the stall hits every connection on that worker, not only the request that caused it. The attacker needs only network access to a handler that calls Request.post(), with no login. A few repeated requests keep the service down. The flaw affects availability only and exposes no data.

The default size limit does not help, since the attack is about field count and not body size. Any app with a form endpoint, such as a login or contact form, is a target.

Who is affected

aiohttp <= 3.14.3, in applications with at least one handler that calls await request.post(). Services that only parse JSON bodies are not on this path. Check the installed version:

pip show aiohttp

Then find the form handlers:

grep -rn "request.post()" .

aiohttp

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 3.14.3
Fixed in
3.14.4
Check
pip show aiohttp

How to fix it

Upgrade to aiohttp 3.14.4:

pip install --upgrade aiohttp==3.14.4

The advisory lists no workaround. A reverse proxy in front of the app can limit request body size and rate, which may reduce the damage, but the advisory does not say it removes the issue.

How to tell if you were hit

Look for event loop stalls: worker CPU pinned at 100 percent, requests hanging, and health check timeouts. In access logs, check for POST requests with form content types and unusually large bodies that came shortly before the stall. Parsing a body with very many repeated keys is the pattern in the advisory, though it names no specific log line.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Request.post() had no limit on the number of fields in a URL-encoded form body. Inserting a large number of repeated keys into a MultiDict took quadratic time on the event loop.

Impact

An attacker could block the event loop with a form POST within the default client_max_size to any handler that calls Request.post().

---

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/615fec3d4f088f30d2ee72cad760152e92aa1c53

Credited to denyspakizh-tob, Dreamsorcerer.

Questions

Does client_max_size protect me from CVE-2026-128126?

No. The advisory says the attack fits within the default client_max_size. The cost comes from the number of repeated form keys, not the size of the body.

Which aiohttp version fixes it?

3.14.4. Versions up to 3.14.3 are affected.

Who is exposed?

Any aiohttp server with a handler that calls Request.post() on a URL-encoded form, reachable without authentication.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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