CVE-2026-13149: brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups
Summary brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.
Published Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 5.0.7
- Fixed in
- 5.0.7
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 1.1.16
- Fixed in
- 1.1.16
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.2
- Fixed in
- 2.1.2
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.
In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:
const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : ['']; // always recurses
...
if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded
}
return [str];
}For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away. Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).
The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.
Measured on 5.0.6:
| groups (n) | input bytes | time | | 20 | 60 | 130 ms | | 24 | 72 | 1.9 s | | 26 | 78 | 7.8 s | | 30 (PoC) | 90 | ~2 min |
Proof of concept
const { expand } = require('brace-expansion');
// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes:
expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix:
- Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.
- Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.
Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.
Credited to bnbdr, ljharb, juliangruber.
References
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13149
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/122
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/123
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/835d6be91201122d9adffb0c0c8c094189ace265
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/c7e33ec13ac1a684c116720843ce24e208611754
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/d74e63030c012e3b7ae81657b8d665619cd51b95
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v1.1.16
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v2.1.2
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v5.0.7
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/brace-expansion
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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