CVE-2026-21885: Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources
Summary Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting /proxy/...
Published Jan 7, 2026 · Updated Jan 8, 2026
Affected packages
miniflux.app/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.2.15
- Fixed in
- 2.2.16
- Check
go list -m miniflux.app/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting /proxy/... URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response.
Details
- Vulnerable route:
GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}(accessible without authentication, but requires a server-generated HMAC-signed URL) - Handler:
internal/ui/proxy.go((*handler).mediaProxy) - Trigger: entry content is rewritten to proxy media URLs (e.g.,
mediaproxy.RewriteDocumentWithAbsoluteProxyURL(...)), producing signed/proxy/...URLs. - Root cause: the proxy validates the URL scheme and HMAC signature, but does not restrict target hosts/IPs. As a result, requests to loopback/private/link-local addresses are allowed and fetched by the server.
PoC
- Run Miniflux 2.2.15 with default configuration (media proxy enabled by default:
MEDIA_PROXY_MODE=http-only).
- Log in with any normal user account.
- Subscribe to a feed you control that contains an entry with an image URL pointing to an internal address reachable from the Miniflux server, e.g.:
/secret">(Note:<internal-target>must be reachable *from the Miniflux process/network*; in containerized setups,127.0.0.1may not refer to the host.)
- Open the entry and locate the rewritten media proxy URL (
/proxy/<encodedDigest>/<encodedURL>) in the rendered HTML/page source.
- Request the
/proxy/...URL.
Expected (vulnerable): Miniflux fetches the internal URL and returns the internal response (SSRF).
Impact
Type: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) via media proxy Who is impacted: Miniflux instances with media proxy enabled (default configuration typically enables it for HTTP/mixed content handling). Impact: attackers with a valid Miniflux account can fetch internal resources reachable from the Miniflux server (e.g., localhost services, private network services, and link-local endpoints such as 169.254.169.254), potentially exposing sensitive data.
Suggested CVSS (v3.1)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (Base 6.5)
If there any questions or issues reproducing this, please contact: [email protected]
Credited to eclipse07077-ljw.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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