CVE-2026-21894: n8n's Missing Stripe-Signature Verification Allows Unauthenticated Forged Webhooks
The n8n Stripe Trigger node in versions 0.150.0 up to but not including 2.2.2 never checks the `Stripe-Signature` header on incoming webhooks. Anyone who knows the webhook URL can post a fake Stripe event with a matching `type` and start the workflow. Upgrade to n8n 2.2.2.
Published Jan 7, 2026 · Updated Jan 8, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026
What an attacker can do
When the Stripe Trigger registers its endpoint, n8n creates and stores a webhook signing secret. Incoming requests were never verified against it. A POST containing an event type that the trigger is subscribed to makes the workflow run as if Stripe had sent it.
The attacker can fake payment or subscription events and influence whatever the workflow does next: granting access, sending goods, updating records or notifying customers. The webhook URL holds a high-entropy UUID, which lowers the risk, but authenticated n8n users who can open the workflow can see that ID, so a low-privileged editor or a leaked URL from logs or screenshots is enough. The vector is rated high complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, with low confidentiality and high integrity impact (CVSS 6.5).
Who is affected
The npm package n8n from 0.150.0 up to 2.2.2 (exclusive), for active workflows that use the Stripe Trigger node. Check the version:
npm ls -g n8nFor Docker, read the image tag or run n8n --version in the container. Then search your workflows for Stripe Trigger nodes that are active.
n8n
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 0.150.0, < 2.2.2
- Fixed in
- 2.2.2
- Check
npm ls n8n
How to fix it
Upgrade to n8n 2.2.2 or later:
npm install -g n8n@latestThe fix verifies Stripe webhook signatures. The advisory says no complete workaround exists. As a temporary measure, deactivate affected workflows, or limit access to workflows with Stripe Trigger nodes to trusted users. If a webhook URL may have leaked, you can also add a check in the workflow that confirms the event ID with the Stripe API before acting on it.
How to tell if you were hit
Compare n8n executions of Stripe-triggered workflows with events in the Stripe dashboard: executions with no matching Stripe event ID point to forged requests. In reverse proxy logs, look for POSTs to the Stripe webhook path from addresses that are not Stripe's, and for requests without a Stripe-Signature header. Review who has access to these workflows, since they can read the webhook ID.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
An authentication bypass in the Stripe Trigger node allows unauthenticated parties to trigger workflows by sending forged Stripe webhook events.
The Stripe Trigger creates and stores a Stripe webhook signing secret when registering the webhook endpoint, but incoming webhook requests were not verified against this secret. As a result, any HTTP client that knows the webhook URL could send a POST request containing a matching event type, causing the workflow to execute as if a legitimate Stripe event had been received.
This issue affects n8n users who have active workflows using the Stripe Trigger node. An attacker could potentially fake payment or subscription events and influence downstream workflow behavior. The practical risk is reduced by the fact that the webhook URL contains a high-entropy UUID; however, authenticated n8n users with access to the workflow can view this webhook ID.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.2.2. Users should upgrade to this version or later to ensure that Stripe webhook signatures are properly verified.
Workarounds
There is no complete workaround short of upgrading. As a temporary mitigation, users can deactivate affected workflows or restrict access to workflows containing Stripe Trigger nodes to trusted users only.
Credited to nkoorty, jjjutla, geckosecurity.
Questions
- Can an attacker guess the webhook URL?
It contains a high-entropy UUID, so guessing is unlikely. But authenticated n8n users with access to the workflow can see it, and leaked logs or shared screenshots expose it too.
- What does the attacker need to send?
A POST request to the webhook URL with a JSON event whose
typematches what the trigger listens for. The signature is not checked.- Is there a workaround?
Not a complete one. The advisory suggests deactivating affected workflows or restricting access to them until you upgrade.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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