CVE-2026-22772: Fulcio is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass
Security Disclosure: SSRF via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass Summary Fulcio's metaRegex() function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible.
Published Jan 13, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/sigstore/fulcio
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.8.4
- Fixed in
- 1.8.5
- Check
go list -m github.com/sigstore/fulcio
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Security Disclosure: SSRF via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass
Summary
Fulcio's metaRegex() function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services.
Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF.
Impact
- SSRF to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254)
- SSRF to internal Kubernetes APIs
- SSRF to any service accessible from Fulcio's network
- Affects ALL deployments using MetaIssuers
Patches
Upgrade to v1.8.5.
Workarounds
None. If anchors are included in the meta issuer configuration URL, they will be escaped before the regular expression is compiled, not making this a sufficient mitigation. Deployments must upgrade to the latest Fulcio release v1.8.5.
Affected Code
File: pkg/config/config.go Function: metaRegex() (lines 143-156)
func metaRegex(issuer string) (*regexp.Regexp, error) {
quoted := regexp.QuoteMeta(issuer)
replaced := strings.ReplaceAll(quoted, regexp.QuoteMeta("*"), "[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+")
return regexp.Compile(replaced) // Missing ^ and $ anchors
}The Bug
The regex has no ^ (start) or $ (end) anchors. Go's regexp.MatchString() does substring matching, so:
Pattern: https://oidc.eks.*.amazonaws.com/id/*
Regex: https://oidc\.eks\.[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+\.amazonaws\.com/id/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+
Input: https://attacker.com/x/https://oidc.eks.foo.amazonaws.com/id/bar
Result: MATCHES (substring found)Exploit
- Attacker sends JWT with
issclaim:https://attacker.com/path/https://oidc.eks.x.amazonaws.com/id/y - Fulcio's
GetIssuer()matches this against MetaIssuer patterns - Unanchored regex matches the embedded pattern as substring
- Fulcio calls
oidc.NewProvider()with attacker's URL - HTTP request goes to
attacker.com, notamazonaws.com - Attacker returns OIDC discovery with
jwks_uripointing to internal service - Fulcio fetches from internal service → SSRF
Credited to morwn.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
