NewApp Monitoring is liveSign up free
AgentbeamBeta
Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-2415: pretix unsafely evaluates variables in emails

highCVSS 4.0 7.5 · 3.1 5.9GHSA-r8p8-qw9w-j9qv

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs: - It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {event.init.code.cofilename}}.

Published Feb 16, 2026 · Updated Mar 13, 2026

Affected packages

pretix

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 2026.1.0, < 2026.1.1
Fixed in
2026.1.1
Check
pip show pretix

pretix

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 2025.10.0, < 2025.10.2
Fixed in
2025.10.2
Check
pip show pretix

pretix

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 2025.9.4
Fixed in
2025.9.4
Check
pip show pretix

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs:

  • It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject.
  • Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions.

Out of caution, pretix recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/  file.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

More PyPI vulnerabilities

All PyPI entries