CVE-2026-24408: sigstore CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing
Summary The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. Details OAuthSession creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value. Fix should be fairly trivial.
Published Jan 26, 2026 · Updated Jan 29, 2026
Affected packages
sigstore
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.2.0
- Fixed in
- 4.2.0
- Check
pip show sigstore
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery.
Details
_OAuthSession creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value.
Fix should be fairly trivial.
Impact
This should be low impact: A man-in-the middle attacker could trick a sigstore-python user into signing something with an identity controlled by the attacker (by returning the response to an authentication request they created). This would be quite confusing but not dangerous.
Credited to jku.
References
- https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/security/advisories/GHSA-hm8f-75xx-w2vr
- https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/commit/5e77497fe8f0b202bdd118949074ec2f20da69aa
- https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-python/releases/tag/v4.2.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24408
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hm8f-75xx-w2vr
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
