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AI agent vulnerability · vLLM

CVE-2026-24779: vLLM vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through MediaConnector

highCVSS 3.1 7.1GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc

vLLM before 0.14.1 can be tricked into making requests to internal hosts. MediaConnector checks a user-supplied media URL's host with one parser and fetches it with another, and the two read backslashes differently, so the allowed-domain check can be bypassed. A signed-in API user can use this against internal services. Fixed in 0.14.1.

Published Jan 28, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026

What an attacker can do

MediaConnector.load_from_url and load_from_url_async fetch images, audio and video from URLs in API requests. They validate the host with urlparse from Python's urllib (RFC 3986), in _assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains. The fetch then goes through requests, which uses urllib3's parse_url (WHATWG-style). The two disagree about backslashes in a URL, so a URL can look like an allowed host to the check and resolve to a different host in the request.

The attacker needs access to the vLLM API with low privileges and a multimodal request that carries a URL. The vLLM server then sends requests to hosts the allowlist was meant to keep off limits: internal services, metadata endpoints and other pods. The CVSS vector rates confidentiality high and availability low.

The advisory singles out containerized setups like llm-d. A compromised vLLM pod could scan the internal network, talk to other pods, or send false metrics such as KV cache state to an internal management endpoint, causing instability. The restriction only matters if you configured allowed media domains; if you did not, the fetch is open anyway.

Who is affected

vllm below 0.14.1, on deployments that accept media URLs in multimodal requests and rely on the media domain allowlist to limit where the server can fetch from. Kubernetes and llm-d style clusters carry the most risk, because internal services are reachable from the pod. Check the version:

pip show vllm

For containers, read the image tag. Red Hat has published errata for its builds.

vllm

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 0.14.1
Fixed in
0.14.1
Check
pip show vllm

How to fix it

Upgrade to vllm 0.14.1.

pip install --upgrade "vllm>=0.14.1"

The fix, in pull request 32746, replaces urlparse with urllib3's parse_url in vllm/multimodal/utils.py, so the check and the request use the same parser. The advisory gives no other workaround. Until you upgrade, add network egress rules so the vLLM pod cannot reach internal services or metadata addresses, and do not expose the API to untrusted callers.

How to tell if you were hit

Look in API request logs for media URLs containing backslashes, or hosts that do not match your allowed domains. Check egress and firewall logs from the vLLM host for connections to internal ranges or cloud metadata addresses that it does not normally contact. In Kubernetes, review network policy denials and unexpected traffic from vLLM pods to management endpoints. The advisory gives no log signature.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the MediaConnector class within the vLLM project's multimodal feature set. The load_from_url and load_from_url_async methods obtain and process media from URLs provided by users, using different Python parsing libraries when restricting the target host. These two parsing libraries have different interpretations of backslashes, which allows the host name restriction to be bypassed. This allows an attacker to coerce the vLLM server into making arbitrary requests to internal network resources.

This vulnerability is particularly critical in containerized environments like llm-d, where a compromised vLLM pod could be used to scan the internal network, interact with other pods, and potentially cause Denial of Service or access sensitive data. For example, an attacker could make the vLLM pod send malicious requests to an internal llm-d management endpoint, leading to system instability by falsely reporting metrics like the KV cache state.

Details

The core of the vulnerability lies in the MediaConnector.load_from_url method and its asynchronous counterpart. These methods accept a URL string to fetch media content (images, audio, video).

def load_from_url( > self, > url: str, > media_io: MediaIO[_M], > *, > fetch_timeout: int | None = None, > ) -> _M: # type: ignore[type-var] > url_spec = urlparse(url) > > if url_spec.scheme.startswith("http"): > self._assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(url_spec) > > connection = self.connection > data = connection.get_bytes( > url, > timeout=fetch_timeout, > allow_redirects=envs.VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS, > ) > > return media_io.load_bytes(data)

The URL validation uses the urlparse function from Python's urllib module, while the request is made using the request function from Python's requests module. The requests module's underlying URL parsing is implemented using the parse_url function from Python's urllib3. These two parsing functions follow different URL specifications; one is implemented according to the RFC 3986 specification, and the other is implemented according to the WHATWG Living Standard. There is a difference in how the two functions handle backslashes (\) in URLs, which allows the hostname restriction to be bypassed.

Fix

  • https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746

Credited to leishilong, leung-yao, Isotr0py, russellb.

Questions

What is the root cause of CVE-2026-24779?

Two URL parsers disagree. The host check uses urllib's urlparse and the fetch uses requests with urllib3's parse_url. They read backslashes differently, so the check can be passed with a URL that goes elsewhere.

Does it need authentication?

The CVSS vector requires low privileges, meaning access to the API. The advisory does not say more about authentication.

Which vLLM version fixes it?

vllm 0.14.1 fixes it. Every earlier version is listed as vulnerable. Red Hat has also published errata for its own builds.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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