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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2026-25500: Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp

Summary Rack::Directory generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the javascript: scheme (e.g. javascript:alert(1)), the generated index includes an anchor whose href attribute is exactly javascript:alert(1). Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

Published Feb 17, 2026 · Updated Mar 10, 2026

Affected packages

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 2.2.22
Fixed in
2.2.22
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.20
Fixed in
3.1.20
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.2.0, < 3.2.5
Fixed in
3.2.5
Check
bundle info rack

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Rack::Directory generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the javascript: scheme (e.g. javascript:alert(1)), the generated index includes an anchor whose href attribute is exactly javascript:alert(1). Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by Rack::Directory.

Details

Rack::Directory renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

%s

The %s placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with javascript:, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

javascript:alert(1)

Because the value is inserted directly into the href attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

Impact

If Rack::Directory is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with javascript:.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

Mitigation

  • Update to a patched version of Rack in which Rack::Directory prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. ./filename).
  • Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via Rack::Directory.
  • Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
  • Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.

HackerOne profile: https://hackerone.com/thesmartshadow

GitHub account owner: Ali Firas (@thesmartshadow)

Credited to thesmartshadow, jeremyevans, ioquatix.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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