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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-25766: Echo has a Windows path traversal via backslash in middleware.Static default filesystem

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9

Summary On Windows, Echo’s middleware.Static using the default filesystem allows path traversal via backslashes, enabling unauthenticated remote file read outside the static root. Details In middleware/static.go, the requested path is unescaped and normalized with path.Clean (URL semantics). path.Clean does not treat \ as a path separator, so ..\ sequences remain in the cleaned path.

Published Feb 17, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/labstack/echo/v5

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 5.0.0, < 5.0.3
Fixed in
5.0.3
Check
go list -m github.com/labstack/echo/v5

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

On Windows, Echo’s middleware.Static using the default filesystem allows path traversal via backslashes, enabling unauthenticated remote file read outside the static root.

Details

In middleware/static.go, the requested path is unescaped and normalized with path.Clean (URL semantics). path.Clean does not treat \ as a path separator, so ..\ sequences remain in the cleaned path. The resulting path is then passed to currentFS.Open(...). When the filesystem is left at the default (nil), Echo uses defaultFS which calls os.Open (echo.go:792). On Windows, os.Open treats \ as a path separator and resolves ..\, allowing traversal outside the static root.

Relevant code:

  • middleware/static.go (path unescape + path.Clean + currentFS.Open)
  • echo.go defaultFS.Open → os.Open

This is the same class as CVE-2020-36565 (fixed in v4 by switching to OS-aware cleaning), but in v5 the path.Clean

  • defaultFS combination reintroduces the Windows backslash traversal.

PoC

Windows only.

Sample code (main.go):

  package main

  import (
        "log"
        "net/http"

        "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
        "github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
  )

  func main() {
        e := echo.New()

        // Important: use middleware.Static with default filesystem (nil)
        e.Use(middleware.Static("public"))

        e.GET("/healthz", func(c *echo.Context) error {
                return c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok")
        })

        addr := ":1323"
        log.Printf("listening on %s", addr)
        if err := e.Start(addr); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
                log.Fatal(err)
        }
  }

Static file:

public/index.html

(content can be any HTML)

Run: go run .

Verify:

curl http://localhost:1323/index.html curl --path-as-is "http://localhost:1323/..%5c..%5cWindows%5cSystem32%5cdrivers%5cetc%5chosts" Expected: 404

Screenshot:

Impact

Path traversal leading to arbitrary file read outside the static root. Any unauthenticated remote user can read local files that the Echo process has access to on Windows, if middleware.Static is used with the default filesystem.

Credited to shblue21, aldas, vishr.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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