CVE-2026-25793: Blocklist Bypass possible via ECDSA Signature Malleability
Impact When using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.
Published Feb 6, 2026 · Updated Feb 9, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/slackhq/nebula
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.7.0, <= 1.10.2
- Fixed in
- 1.10.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/slackhq/nebula
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
When using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.
In order for this to affect a user or network, all of the following must be true:
CURVE_P256certificates are being used- There are one or more entries on the blocklist
- The certificates for those entries are signed by a trusted CA and not expired
- An attacker has a copy of the private key, and corresponding certificate, for one of those blocklist entries
Patches
See attached
Workarounds
If full copies of each certificate on the existing blocklist are available, it is possible to compute their opposite-chirality signature, and then the appropriate second fingerprint to list in the blocklist.
Rotating out all CAs that have signed hosts on the blocklist will also prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.
Credited to 0xnul1byt3.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
