NewApp Monitoring is liveSign up free
AgentbeamBeta
Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-25890: File Browser has a Path-Based Access Control Bypass via Multiple Leading Slashes in URL

highCVSS 3.1 8.1GHSA-4mh3-h929-w968

Summary An authenticated user can bypass the application's "Disallow" file path rules by modifying the request URL. By adding multiple slashes (e.g., //private/) to the path, the authorization check fails to match the rule, while the underlying filesystem resolves the path correctly, granting unauthorized access to restricted files.

Published Feb 10, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.57.0
Fixed in
2.57.1
Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An authenticated user can bypass the application's "Disallow" file path rules by modifying the request URL. By adding multiple slashes (e.g., //private/) to the path, the authorization check fails to match the rule, while the underlying filesystem resolves the path correctly, granting unauthorized access to restricted files.

Details

The vulnerability allows users to bypass "Disallow" rules defined by administrators.

The issue stems from how the application handles URL path normalization and rule matching:

  1. Router Configuration: The router in http/http.go is configured with r.SkipClean(true). This prevents the automatic collapse of multiple slashes (e.g., // becoming /) before the request reaches the handler.
  2. Insecure Rule Matching: The rule enforcement logic in rules/rules.go relies on a simple string prefix match: strings.HasPrefix(path, r.Path). If a rule disallows /private, a request for //private fails this check because //private does not strictly start with /private.
  3. Filesystem Resolution: After bypassing the rule check, the non-normalized path is passed to the filesystem. The filesystem treats the multiple slashes as a single separator, successfully resolving //private/secret.txt and serving the file.

PoC

Python minimal PoC

The following steps demonstrate the vulnerability:

  1. Setup:
  2. Admin user creates a folder /private and adds a file /private/secret.txt.
  • Admin adds a Disallow rule for user bob on the path /private.
  1. Verification:
  2. User bob requests GET /api/resources/private/secret.txt.
  3. Server responds: 403 Forbidden.
  1. Exploit:
  2. User bob requests GET /api/resources//private/secret.txt.
  3. Server responds: 200 OK (Bypass successful).

Impact

This vulnerability impacts the confidentiality and integrity of data stored in filebrowser.

  • Confidentiality: Users can read files they are explicitly forbidden from accessing.
  • Integrity: If the user has general write permissions but is restricted from specific directories via rules, they can bypass these restrictions to rename, delete, or modify files.

Credited to Fluxmux, hacdias.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

More Go vulnerabilities

All Go entries