CVE-2026-26317: OpenClaw affected by cross-site request forgery (CSRF) through loopback browser mutation endpoints
OpenClaw's browser control servers bind to loopback but accepted cross-origin POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE requests without Origin or Referer checks. A malicious website can drive the victim's local browser control plane. `openclaw` 2026.2.14 fixes it; the older `clawdbot` package has no patched version.
Published Feb 18, 2026 · Updated Feb 20, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
Binding to localhost limits network exposure but does not stop a browser. Any web page the victim opens can send requests to loopback addresses from the victim's browser. The OpenClaw browser control endpoints that change state had no CSRF-style guard, so a page from a non-loopback origin could trigger them.
Per the advisory, that includes opening tabs, starting and stopping the browser, and changing storage and cookies. The attacker needs only a webpage the victim visits while the browser control service is reachable on loopback, and no credentials, if browser control auth is off. The CVSS vector shows high integrity impact and low availability impact, with no data read. Changing cookies and storage in a browser the agent controls can disturb logged-in sessions or plant state the agent later trusts.
The clawdbot package, an older name for the project, is also listed.
Who is affected
Affected: openclaw before 2026.2.14, and clawdbot at <= 2026.1.24-3. Check what you run:
npm ls openclaw clawdbotExposure needs the browser control service running on loopback. Setups with browser control auth (token or password) disabled are the most open.
openclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2026.2.14
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.14
- Check
npm ls openclaw
clawdbot
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2026.1.24-3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
npm ls clawdbot
How to fix it
Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.14.
npm install [email protected]The fix rejects mutating methods (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) when the request shows a non-loopback Origin or Referer, or Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site. clawdbot has no patched version listed, so move to openclaw. The advisory also advises enabling browser control auth with a token or password and not running with auth disabled.
How to tell if you were hit
Check browser control server logs for state-changing requests carrying a non-loopback Origin or Referer header, or Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site. Look for tabs, browser starts and stops, or cookie and storage changes that no one on your team triggered, especially right after someone browsed an unfamiliar site.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.
Impact
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context.
Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): <= 2026.1.24-3
Details
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.
Fix
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site).
Fix Commit(s)
- openclaw/openclaw: b566b09f81e2b704bf9398d8d97d5f7a90aa94c3
Workarounds / Mitigations
- Enable browser control auth (token/password) and avoid running with auth disabled.
- Upgrade to a release that includes the fix.
Credits
- Reporter: @vincentkoc
Release Process Note
patched_versions is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, the advisory should be ready to publish with no further edits.
Credited to vincentkoc.
Questions
- Does binding to localhost protect me?
Not fully. The advisory says loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not stop browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.
- Is clawdbot fixed?
The package data shows no patched version for
clawdbotat<= 2026.1.24-3. Move toopenclaw2026.2.14 or later.- Is CVE-2026-26317 exploited in the wild?
No source reports exploitation, and it is not in CISA's KEV catalog.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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